

THE PROCEEDINGS
of
THE SOUTH CAROLINA
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
1949

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The South Carolina Historical Association supplies *The Proceedings* to all its members. The Executive Committee elects the Editor. Beginning with 1935, every fifth number contains an index for the preceding five years. The price of *The Proceedings* to persons not members of the Association is \$1.00 per copy. Orders should be sent to the Secretary-Treasurer, Clemson College, Clemson, S. C.

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ROBERT D. OCHS

Editor

COLUMBIA
THE SOUTH CAROLINA
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THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL MEETING

The nineteenth annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association was held at the University of South Carolina and the Jefferson Hotel, Columbia, on April 2, 1949. Miss Lillian Kibler, President of the Association presided.

At the morning session two papers were read and discussed: "Kiderlen-Waechter's Policy in the Bosnian Crisis" by C. Waldron Bolen of Clemson College; and "Woodrow Wilson's Pan-American Pact" by Charles H. Carlisle of Erskine College.

The luncheon business meeting heard and accepted the Treasurer's report. Officers chosen for 1949-50 were: R. H. Wienefeld, President; Carl L. Epting, Vice-President; Thomas B. Alexander, Secretary-Treasurer; Anne King Gregorie, Executive Committee Member. The Association adopted a resolution requesting the South Carolina Historical Commission to support publication of historical material on South Carolina in the annual *Proceedings* of the Association in the amount of one hundred dollars annually.

Two papers were read and discussed at the afternoon session: "The Teaching of High School History—A Point of View" by Lucia Daniel, University High School; and "South Carolina Cotton Mills and the Tillman Movement" by Gustavus G. Williamson, Jr., Johns Hopkins University.

At the evening banquet session E. Baskin Wright of the University of South Carolina discussed "The Problem of Negro Education in the South".

The Executive Committee continued Robert D. Ochs as editor of the *Proceedings* of the Association.

WOODROW WILSON'S PAN-AMERICAN PACT

CHARLES H. CARLISLE

I

Woodrow Wilson, as President of the United States, in his message to the Congress on December 7, 1915, said:

It presents them [the states of America] as in a very true and deep sense a unit in world affairs, spiritual partners, standing together, quick with common sympathies, and common ideals. Separated, they are subject to all the cross currents of the confused politics of a world of hostile rivalries; united in spirit and purpose, they cannot be disappointed of their peaceful destiny.

This is Pan-Americanism. It has none of the spirit of empire in it. It is the embodiment, the effectual embodiment, of the spirit of law and independence and liberty and mutual service.¹

It is the spirit of the above message which represents the very basis of Wilson's Pan-American policy. His whole plan was to unite the two continents in action and in thought. Through a spirit of cooperation, international trade would develop to the benefit of all. He hoped that a feeling of confidence in the United States would be produced in the Latin-American states by his outspoken diplomacy and his repeated pronouncements of our desire for peace and harmony.² Wilson, on several occasions, stated his adherence to the principles of President Monroe. He stated that the United States still meant to defend the "common cause of international independence and of political liberty in America".³ Wilson was contemplating the possibility of converting the Monroe Doctrine from a national policy into a continental one in which all the American states might participate.⁴ Wilson stated in one of his addresses that he felt that the states of America might attain a new significance in the political history of the world by their increasing consciousness of common political and economic problems.⁵ With this

¹ Albert Shaw, *President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses* (New York, 1918), p. 136.

² Harley Notter, *The Origin of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (Baltimore, 1937), p. 224.

³ William S. Robertson, *History of the Latin-American Nations* (New York, 1932), p. 735.

⁴ Sumner Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard, The Dominican Republic, 1844-1924* (New York, 1928), II, 933.

⁵ Edgar E. Robinson and Victor J. West, *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917* (New York, 1918), p. 75.

policy of cooperation in all affairs it is not surprising that a plan of union should arise.

It was only a few days after Wilson had made an address in which he stated that the American people must be friends of their Latin-American neighbors on "terms of equality and honor" that he was confronted with a proposal which, if carried out, might have put his ideas into action.⁶ William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State, wrote to the President on November 5, 1913, enclosing a letter he had received from Representative Slayden of Texas.⁷ Congressman Slayden's letter has not been made public;⁸ however, Bryan stated that Slayden's letter was an explanation of a resolution he had introduced in the House of Representatives for a treaty among the nations of this hemisphere.⁹ Wilson was greatly impressed by the proposal and hoped to give it more serious thought at a later date. At the time the complications of the Mexican situation held first place in his thoughts concerning his southern neighbors.¹⁰ Congressman Slayden's suggestion died in the House Foreign Relations Committee, but it had caused some to turn their thoughts in the direction of Pan-Americanism.

A similar proposal was presented to Wilson in January, 1914, by Perez Triana, former Columbian minister to Great Britain, but it met a somewhat similar fate.¹¹

It remained for Wilson's advisor and close personal friend, Colonel E. M. House of Texas, to present the proposal for a league of American states before any concrete action was taken. House had watched the failure of European diplomacy before the outbreak of World War I. He realized that a system of international cooperation was needed among the Americas—not in the distant future—but then.¹² It was on the occasion of a visit by the President that House on November 15, 1914, "urged the President to turn from domestic affairs and take up the problem of 'welding together of the two western continents' "¹³ A month later, on December 16, 1914, House presented an additional reason for this union. This league of Ameri-

⁶ Address of President Wilson to the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, Alabama, on October 27, 1913. Shaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

⁷ Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters* (New York, 1931), IV, 285.

⁸ Notter, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

⁹ Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Notter, *op. cit.*, p. 281; Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

¹² Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Cambridge, 1926), I, 207.

¹³ Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, *The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 1890-1920* (Baltimore, 1942), p. 322.

can republics would serve as an embryo society of nations. Wilson was captivated by the idea. The Western World would set an example for the European nations to follow at the conclusion of hostilities.¹⁴ Wilson hoped that the New World might aid the Old World after the war by furnishing leadership in the making of a lasting peace and by showing that it had learned the value of cooperation among nations.¹⁵

Colonel House put into writing this desire for a union of American states in a letter to the President on November 30, 1914, and followed this by an interview on December 16, in connection with this proposal. His idea was for a loose organization of American republics which would set up machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes and, most of all, guarantee security from aggression. The New World had seen so many revolutions in which foreign manufacturers supplied the munitions of war to those in revolt, that House suggested that "government ownership of munitions of war" be included.¹⁶

Wilson then wrote his first two points:

1st. Mutual guaranties of political independence under republican form of government and mutual guaranties of territorial integrity.

2nd. Mutual agreement that the Government of each of the contracting parties acquire complete control within its jurisdiction of manufacture and sale of munitions of war.¹⁷

A copy of the two points was given to House to use in his interviews with the A.B.C. Ambassadors.¹⁸ It seemed expedient to begin negotiations with these most important Latin-American nations.

The first of these points was a combination of House's suggestion and Wilson's own ideas. It was here that almost the exact wording of Article X of the League of Nations Covenant originated.¹⁹ This gives the Pact a special significance.

The second of these points, concerning munitions of war, which had been a part of Wilson's peace program in August, 1914, was now being applied to his Latin-American neighbors. Possibly the difficulties which had been encountered in subduing

¹⁴ Notter, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 459-460.

¹⁶ Seymour, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-209.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, A.B.C. Powers are Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

Article X of the League of Nations Covenant:

The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression and territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

the revolutions in Santo Domingo, because of the work of merchants in Haiti in selling munitions and arms, caused this point to receive due consideration.²⁰

As Wilson began his administration, he set up certain objectives for his New World policy. He wished to uphold and expand the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, to accentuate the United States' opposition to aggressive expansion, to make the Western Hemisphere a place of free, self-governed people friendly to the United States, and to work for peace. The Pact was an attempt to fulfill these predetermined objectives.²¹

Wilson preferred that the negotiations be carried on by House rather than by Secretary of State Bryan, but felt that the latter must be informed of the plan. Bryan did not place too much importance on the idea as he felt that his "cooling-off" treaties with most of the Latin-American republics were sufficient. House sent Bryan periodic reports on his progress.²²

House was not sure that Wilson would have a chance to "play a great and beneficent part" in the European conflagration, but Wilson might succeed in setting up a world example of cooperation and goodwill in the Americas.²³ Colonel House expressed his opinion on the importance of the Pact in a letter to Wilson:

This is a matter of such far-reaching consequences that I feel we should pay more attention to it just now than even the European affair, for the reason that, if brought to a successful conclusion, the one must have a decided influence on the other.²⁴

On December 19 House was successful in gaining interviews with the A.B.C. Ambassadors. Each one agreed to cable the proposal to his government and also to ask that it be approved.²⁵ Replies were received from Brazil and Argentina on December 24 and 29 respectively. Da Gama, the Brazilian Ambassador, declared that both points of Wilson's proposal were agreeable to his government and revealed his own enthusiasm for the plan by referring to this as "an epoch-making negotiation".²⁶ Ambassador Naon of Argentina stated that his government gave its endorsement to the proposal and, like Da Gama, Naon expressed personal enthusiasm for the plan. He said, "It will be such a great accomplishment that there will be nothing

²⁰ Notter, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 375-376.

²² Seymour, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-211.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 212-214.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

he [Wilson] can ever do afterwards that can approach it in importance."²⁷

Chile's reply to House's proposal did not come until January 21, 1915. The boundary disputes with Bolivia and Peru were the reasons for this hesitancy. Chile was not satisfied that provision would be made for such disputes.²⁸ Chile's reply was ambiguous, but it was not accepted for what it was worth in hopes that it would lead to something better.²⁹

Since all treaties to which the United States is a member must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, it seemed wise that the Senators' opinion should be obtained before proceeding further. Wilson consulted Senator James M. Stone, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and found him quite sympathetic. Stone was also of the opinion that the Senate would be willing to endorse the plan.³⁰

House and Wilson came to an understanding on two important points in regard to procedure. First, they agreed that there should be only one convention to which all the republics would agree instead of making twenty-one different treaties. The second point was to the effect that the A.B.C. Powers and the United States would carry the negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion before consulting the smaller republics.³¹

Before House's departure on his special mission to Europe in January, 1915, the President turned more toward his Secretary of State under whom the negotiations would fall in House's absence. Wilson, Bryan, and Robert Lansing, a member of the State Department staff, met in a conference at which Bryan suggested that one article of the Pact should include the essence of his peace treaties. Wilson agreed and intended to formulate the article himself, but other pressing problems demanded his attention. On January 29 Wilson sent a partially written article to Bryan to complete. Bryan completed the article and submitted it to the President; whereupon, Wilson sent Bryan a complete copy of the four draft articles for the proposed Pan-American Pact.³² Copies of these articles were also sent to the Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean Ambassadors to be forwarded to their respective governments.³³

Article I provided for the guarantee of territorial integrity

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

²⁸ Callcott, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

²⁹ Seymour, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-218.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 216-217.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

³² *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920* (Washington, 1940), II, 471-472.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 473.

and of common political independence under republican forms of government. Arbitration of disputes between nations with a time limit on the settlement was covered by Article II. Article III would pledge each nation to control the manufacture and sale of munitions of war within its boundaries to prevent the sale and shipment of such munitions to other countries. The principle of Bryan's peace treaties was incorporated into the Pact as Article IV.³⁴

For the next six months while House, the chief protagonist of the Pact, was in Europe the Pact was stalemated. Wilson, who was too busy with other matters, turned the plan over to the imaginative Bryan. Only one goal presented itself to Bryan and that was to keep the New World nations out of the European conflict—a goal which later caused his break with Wilson and his resignation. The little assistance to the Pact that Bryan did give was to further his desire for preservation of the neutral rights of the countries of the Western Hemisphere in the war and to have some influence in bringing peace to the world.³⁵

On March 8, Bryan made a report to Wilson in which he gave the reaction of the A.B.C. Powers to the four articles submitted to them. Brazil was in accord with all phases of the proposition except on arbitration. Argentina was behind the program one hundred per cent. No word had been received from Chile.³⁶

Wilson felt that once the approval of Argentina and Brazil was secured the Pact should be put through without waiting on Chile. Like Bryan, Wilson thought the Pact should be so drawn as to allow nations to enter later if they did not choose to do so then. He felt that if several of the larger states and a number of the smaller states signed, Chile would fall in line. In regard to Brazil, he asserted that the main point was that Brazil accept the program in principle and then some arrangement could be worked out in regard to the arbitration provision.³⁷

Almost a month later the first word was received from the Chilean Government concerning the four articles. Here the first serious opposition developed. Chile's reply was in the form of a counterproposal; and the Chilean Government opposed the time limit on arbitration of disputes, the guarantee of republican form of government, and the guarantee of territorial in-

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 472-473.

³⁵ Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed., *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (New York, 1929), X, 19-21.

³⁶ *Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, II, 473-474.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

tegrity, plus other minor technical matters.³⁸

Wilson advised Bryan to go ahead with the Pact in such form as would be agreeable to Argentina and Brazil. If Chile desired to enter now or later, she could do so. Wilson felt that any alteration in the provision in order to meet Chile's desires would mean the destruction of the value of the Pact.³⁹

A very lengthy reply to Chile's counter proposal was sent to the Chilean Ambassador by Bryan with Wilson's endorsement. He closed his communication by expressing the hope that Chile would join in the Pact at the same time as the others.⁴⁰

Although Wilson's time was consumed by his fight for the rights of neutrals in an ever-threatening war, he did give encouragement to the Pact on various occasions. On March 29, 1915, he told a number of Latin-American dignitaries:

. . . we are rapidly approaching a day when the Americas will draw together as they have never drawn together before, and . . . it will be a union, not of political ties, but of understanding and mutual helpfulness.⁴¹

II

On June 9, 1915, Bryan resigned his post in the cabinet over a difference of opinion with Wilson on the attitude that the Government should take toward the German Empire. On that day the Pan-American Pact ended its first phase. It had seen a period of progress under House and one of decline under Bryan. With the rise of Lansing from a lesser post in the State Department to the Secretaryship on June 23, 1915, the Pact started on its second period of progress and decline.

The appointment of Lansing as Secretary of State very nearly coincided with the return of Colonel House from Europe. House had to inform Lansing of all the details concerning the Pact. Lansing knew very little about the proposed plan and knew of nothing on file in the State Department. Once informed of previous communications concerning the Pact, with the encouragement of House, Lansing put forth a strong effort to attain success.⁴²

During the first week of October, 1915, Wilson, Lansing, and House made their plans for further negotiations. It seemed necessary to change the provision concerning the manufacture and sale of arms and munitions if it was to prove acceptable.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 476-478.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 479.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 481-484.

⁴¹ Notter, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

⁴² Bemis, ed., *op. cit.*, X, 111-112; Seymour, *op. cit.*, pp. 222-223; *Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, II, 486-488.

According to the previous plan, the government was to control this industry. This provision was changed to "an automatic embargo on munitions in case of revolutionary attack upon an existing government."⁴³

When this proposal with its changes was presented to the Argentine Ambassador, he stated that "there would be considerable objection to the arbitration provision in the second article in that it placed a time limit upon the settlement of disputed territorial claims". The next day Naon presented a counter proposal—that the time limit be omitted. Wilson felt that this new article was distinctly inferior to the original. He would agree to the removal of the time limit only if it were stated that the settlement must be made as soon as possible.⁴⁴

Lansing saw the Chilean Ambassador on October 27 and convinced him of the necessity for the guarantee of political independence. Suarez blamed his earlier objection to this provision on Bryan's presenting it "with practically no explanation as to the meaning".⁴⁵ Because of its territorial dispute with Peru, Chile wished the time limit on settlement of disputes removed under all conditions.⁴⁶

In a letter to the President, Lansing stated that the first proposition "is the essence of the compact and if we can secure his [Suarez] adhesion to that we can, in all probability, remove anything objectionable in the other propositions".⁴⁷

Lansing immediately began a general revision of the various provisions in accordance with the desired changes.⁴⁸ Wilson approved this new draft, which he considered the best which could be obtained. The revised draft was presented to the A.B.C. Ambassadors. Naon and Da Gama approved "cordially" and Suarez gave "his personal endorsement".⁴⁹ Lansing was convinced that the Chilean Ambassador would do all in his power "to secure favorable action by his government".⁵⁰

With the main objections of the A.B.C. Powers removed from the Pact, success seemed quite near.⁵¹ For the first time the public was informed of the essence of the Pact when President Wilson addressed the Pan-American Scientific Conference

⁴³ Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

⁴⁴ *Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, II, 488-489.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 489-491.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 489-490.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 491.

⁴⁸ Seymour, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-234.

⁴⁹ Callcott, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-328.

⁵⁰ Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

⁵¹ Notter, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

on January 6, 1916.⁵² He spoke first of the desirability of friendliness and cooperation among all the American states and then emphasized the chief features of the administration's Pan-American program.⁵³ In speaking of the Pact, Wilson said:

And latterly there has been a very frank interchange of views between the authorities in Washington and those who represented the other States of this hemisphere, an interchange of views charming and hopeful, because based upon an increasingly sure appreciation of the spirit in which they were undertaken. These gentlemen have seen that if America is to come into her own, into her legitimate own, in a world of peace and order, she must establish the foundation of amity so that no one will hereafter doubt them.⁵⁴

Wilson then stated in brief the contents of the various articles of the proposed Pact.

The American missions in the various Latin-American nations were informed of the proposals and instructed to "express the interest taken in this proposal by the President of the United States and the hope of this government that a treaty to this end may be signed by all the American Republics".⁵⁵

In December, 1915, House was sent on another mission to Europe where he remained until March, 1916. During this time he did not forget the Pan-American Pact. Conversations were held with the Chilean Ambassador to Great Britain, the British Foreign Minister, and members of the British Parliament. House desired British support, and even considered the possibility of the participation of Canada in the Covenant. Up until this time, only independent nations had been included.⁵⁶ The British leaders consulted by House thought it best for Britain to wait for a more favorable opportunity before making a public statement.

House kept in mind this possibility of including Canada in the Pact. On June 18, 1916, he suggested to Wilson that the phrase "republican form of government" be changed to read "existing forms of government", since this would be necessary before allowing foreign possessions to join.⁵⁷ This suggestion was given no further thought as complications had already arisen to halt the good progress which had been made.

It was not long after Wilson's optimistic speech to the Scientific Conference that new difficulties began to develop. Brazil had expressed complete accord with the proposals in December, 1915,

⁵² Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

⁵³ Robinson and West, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

⁵⁴ Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁵⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916* (Washington, 1925), pp. 3-4.

⁵⁶ Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

⁵⁷ Callcott, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

but by the latter part of January it became evident that influences were at work to defeat the purposes of the treaty. According to word received from Da Gama, Brazil was no longer enthusiastic over the idea.⁵⁸

Chile resumed its position as the chief opponent of the Pact in January, although Suarez had given great hopes to Lansing in December, in regard to Chile's position. The main objection this time was to Article III, which according to Chile, embodied the principle of the Bryan Peace Treaties and made arbitration compulsory. The formal reply to the revised draft of the Pact came from Chile on March 9, 1916. Since it continued along this same line, Wilson was now convinced that it would be well to go ahead without Chile.⁵⁹

House suggested to Wilson that the services of Henry P. Fletcher be used in completing the Pact. Fletcher had offered to handle the negotiations in the fall of 1915, when he was ambassador to Chile. He was well versed on Latin-American relations and was willing to assume this new responsibility although he had recently been appointed ambassador to Mexico. The suggestion was followed and Lansing turned the negotiations over to Fletcher.⁶⁰

Fletcher was confronted with the same problems. He had the whole-hearted support of the smaller nations, but as Wilson and House strengthened their views of the Pact as a basis for a world-wide program, the larger American republics showed that their interests were in "private objectives" instead of "world principles".⁶¹

The Argentine Ambassador was not willing to sign, and Brazil did not approve of proceeding without Chile. Chile still remained definitely and decidedly opposed to the treaty. Fletcher's opinion was that the treaty should not be pushed without Chile unless Argentina and Brazil favored such. He feared that Chile would turn to other countries in finance and trade and gradually would become hostile toward the United States.⁶²

Then the tense situation which developed between Mexico and the United States halted all progress on the Pact. Villa, who was opposing the Carranza regime in Mexico, used his position as a "liberal patriot" to further his bandit raids. On March 8, 1916, he raided Columbus, New Mexico, killing seventeen American citizens. The United States Government im-

⁵⁸ *Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, II, 493-494.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 494.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 495; Callcott, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

⁶¹ Callcott, *op. cit.*, pp. 329-330.

⁶² *Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, II, 496-497.

mediately sent Pershing to suppress Villa. When Pershing's troops crossed into Mexican territory, the Carranza Government resorted to verbal and military retaliation. War seemed imminent. Under these conditions the Latin-American nations would not sign the Pact and the United States could not push the matter without leaving the impression that we wished it for our own good and not for the good of all the American republics. During the summer of 1916, negotiations for the Pact were abandoned.⁶³

By September the Mexican crisis had eased and Argentina was ready to sign again. Chile, however, continued her opposition and became more and more disinterested in the idea. The once enthusiastic Brazil was still reluctant.⁶⁴

The last mention of the Pact made by House in his diary was on October 1, 1916. No doubt he saw that success was impossible at that time.⁶⁵

Upon the entrance of the United States into World War I in April, 1917, Lansing questioned the advisability of signing the Pact, but the Brazilian Government became quite anxious to sign as the Pact would give that country an excuse to go to war against Germany. The Pact might have brought some of the smaller republics into the war on the side of the United States, but Lansing thought that that might be more of a liability than an asset.⁶⁶

It was only a matter of a few months before the Administration was so busily engaged in the war that the idea of the Pact for the American states was dropped. The idea was not dead, however, as it was to be expanded later into the League of Nations.⁶⁷

III

Why had the Pact failed in the New World? There were many complications which led to its abandonment. The strongest opposition had come from Chile; and therefore it received and should receive a major portion of the blame for the failure. It was Chile's objection that halted progress from the very beginning. The fact that the Tacna-Arica boundary dispute was in question was responsible for Chile's objection. She refused

⁶³ Seymour, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-231.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 231-232.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

Sumner Welles feels that the American people would have rejected the Pact had the approval of the A.B.C. Powers been secured. Welles, *op. cit.*, pp. 933-934.

⁶⁶ *Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, II, 498.

⁶⁷ Callcott, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

to join any union which would restrain her selfish desires to maintain control of these two Peruvian provinces.⁶⁸ This caused Chile to oppose the arbitration section with its time limit on settlements and the guarantee of territorial integrity. Chile should be blamed, also, for her hesitancy in replying to the various proposals and alterations made for her benefit.

Probably one weakness in the negotiations was the fact that so many different individuals played a directing role. Besides the overall direction of Wilson, the Pact passed through the negotiating hands of House, Bryan, Lansing, and Fletcher. Of course, House was supposed to be the actual director of the proceedings, but if the matter were of as great importance as Wilson said, he would have placed it in the hands of an official—most probably, the Secretary of State. Even politics may have contributed to the defeat of the plan. Wilson was never an admirer of Bryan's policies and had appointed him to the cabinet for political reasons. He may have realized that Bryan would not push the matter if it were placed in his hands. Wilson left the program to the man he probably would have liked to have had as Secretary of State.

Over a long period of years the Latin-American nations had come to look upon the "colossus of the North" with fear and suspicion. Although assurances were given from time to time that the United States had no desire other than to protect its neighbors, they could not help but wonder, after seeing the American policy of intervention in some of the smaller states. This Pact appeared to them only as an excuse for United States intervention in domestic affairs.⁶⁹

In spite of the failure of completing the Pact, it became the foundation upon which Wilson based his most important work for world peace—the League of Nations. Wilson revealed this when he addressed a group of Mexican editors in June, 1918:

The whole family of nations will have to guarantee to each nation that no nation shall violate its political independence or its territorial integrity. That is the basis—the only conceivable basis—for the future peace of the world, and I must admit that I was anxious to have the States of the two continents of America to show the way to the rest of the world as to how to make a peace.⁷⁰

The first proposition of the Pact, as has already been stated, was used in almost its original wording in Article X of the

⁶⁸ Charles Edmond Akers, *A History of South America, 1854-1904* (New York, 1912), pp. 402-403.

⁶⁹ John Holladay Latane, *A History of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1934), pp. 650-651.

⁷⁰ Earl Willis Crecraft, "A League of Nations in the Making", *New York Times*, Dec. 2, 1918, p. 12, col. 7.

League Covenant. The League members did not have to maintain a "republican form of government", but they had to have a government "based upon the consent of the governed". The League met the problem in regard to the "exportation of arms" by the power to control this trade in countries where it seemed necessary. The World Court was set up to settle international disputes. This paralleled the Pact's provision for arbitration.⁷¹

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

It is true that the League of Nations failed, but not because of the principles involved, but because they were not defended. Once again the people of the world are placing their highest hopes for the maintenance of peace in a world organization—the United Nations. If one can visualize the proposed Pan-American Pact as a milestone along the difficult road which mankind has been traveling in search of lasting peace and international cooperation, the true significance of the Pact will have been grasped.

KIDERLEN-WAECHTER'S POLICY IN THE BOSNIAN CRISIS

C. WALDRON BOLEN

Although historians are not in complete accord on the division of responsibility for World War I, they have accepted the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans as the major cause of the conflict. Germany's responsibility has been difficult to assess because the documents reveal the men in the Wilhelmstrasse playing a double game with Vienna. Having been convinced, after the Italian disloyalty at Algeciras, that the Triple Alliance was not solid, the directors of German policy believed their own security rested on the preservation of Austria as a great power. Consequently the policies of the ally had to be supported, even to the point of war. On the other hand, because this support indicated encouragement for Austria's expansionist aims in the Balkans, the Germans tried to exercise a restraining influence in Vienna. This diplomatic pattern of guiding a policy in two directions at the same time was shaped by Chancellor Buelow and Kiderlen-Waechter during the Bosnian annexation crisis. Because of his wide knowledge of Balkan affairs, the latter was summoned from Bucharest to head the foreign office, in November, 1908, when Schoen, the permanent secretary, became ill.

Kiderlen was one of the last of those young diplomats who began their careers under Chancellor Bismarck. He had served as counselor or secretary in the embassies at Copenhagen, St. Petersburg, Paris, and Constantinople. Afterwards, the old Chancellor recalled him to Berlin, and appointed him to accompany the young Kaiser, William II, on his cruises aboard the *Hohenzollern*. William soon became fond of Kiderlen, whose talent as a narrator of amusing stories and smutty jokes was always in demand. Bismarck's dismissal and the resignation of other members of the service hastened the young diplomat's rise to a position of influence. In fact, Holstein, Marschall, and Kiderlen were largely responsible for dropping the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. But Kiderlen's star soon set. After filling the position of minister to Hamburg and later to Copenhagen, he was sent off to Bucharest because of his indiscreet remarks about the Kaiser. As minister to Rumania, which post he held for ten years. Kiderlen had ample opportunity to become schooled in Balkan politics. Moreover, on two occasions he relieved am-

bassador Marschall at Constantinople, where he obtained concessions for the Bagdad Railway and prevented the other ambassadors from forcing Turkey to adopt administrative reforms in Macedonia. He also maintained Germany's influence at the Porte during the Young Turk Revolution of July, 1908.

When Kiderlen arrived in Berlin to take over the foreign office, the Bosnian crisis was a month old. Aehrenthal and Izvol'ski, the foreign ministers of Austria and Russia respectively, had planned a bilateral move in the Balkans before the Young Turks could strengthen their empire. The Austrian announcement of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October, however, caught the Russians empty-handed. Izvol'ski had not had time to prepare the ground for his part of the bargain, namely, the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. To save face, he now demanded a conference of the powers, which should approve alterations to the Treaty of Berlin of 1878. Despite the fact that Germany had an unsettled diplomatic problem of her own, the Casablanca affair, she was staunchly supporting her ally. At first the Kaiser wanted the annexation edict withdrawn, but the Chancellor won him over with the argument that this action might drive Austria into the camp of the entente powers.¹ Picking up the diplomatic reins here, Kiderlen seconded Buelow's point of view. Since his appointment was temporary, he complained to his blond mistress, Frau Kypke, that he was supposed to make the cart float again and then depart.²

In order to emerge from the crisis with a diplomatic victory, Kiderlen realized that the Central Powers would have to maintain a solid front. He therefore instructed Ratibor, the German minister in Belgrade, to participate in representations by the powers in the interest of peace;³ but under no conditions would he accept the British proposal for like overtures in Vienna.⁴ To insure the desired degree of solidarity, the German secretary also began to check more closely on Aehrenthal's activities. Undoubtedly this procedure irritated the Austrian, who was reported to have been pleased when Schoen returned to the office. "Naturally," remarked Kiderlen, "the first violin will now be

¹ Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, ed., *Die Grosse Politik der Europaeischen Kabinette, 1871-1914: Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswaertigen Amtes* (Berlin, 1922-1927), XXVI, 111-114; cited hereafter as G. P.

² Ernst Jaeckh, *Kiderlen-Waechter der Staatsmann und Mensch, Briefwechsel und Nachlass* (Berlin, 1925), II, 12.

³ G. P., XXVI, 267-268, 272; L. Bittner, A. F. Pribram, H. Srbik, and H. Uebersberger, ed., *Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914* (Vienna, 1930), I, 459-460; cited hereafter as O.-U. A.

⁴ G. P. XXVI, 276-277.

played by Vienna instead of by us."⁵ On the advice of Holstein, now in retirement, the Chancellor retained Kiderlen in Berlin until the crisis was settled.⁶ Later events proved that this was an improtant decision for his future.

The first step in dissolving the crisis was to get Turkey to accept the accomplished fact, for German commercial interests required good relations with the Porte. Notwithstanding the Russian and Serbian objections to the annexation, Turkey was the only power whose sovereign rights had been violated. The resentment of the Serbs was due largely to their disappointment in not being able to form a great Serbia, which would have included Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, Kiderlen immediately began urging Austria to make a financial settlement with the Porte for the loss of the provinces.⁷ At the same time, he counseled moderation on all sides. Turkey was advised to negotiate with Austria and to remove the boycott on Austrian goods; England was asked to use her influence in Constantinople in favor of settlement; and Austria was warned not to break off diplomatic relations with Turkey.⁸ There was real cause for anxiety, for Marschall reported early in December that the Austro-Turkish tension was increasing, a condition which he attributed to Aehrenthal's refusal to negotiate a financial settlement until the boycott was removed.⁹ Again Kiderlen urged the Austrian government to satisfy Turkey with a money compensation. Evidence that he was displeased with Aehrenthal's use of German support is contained in the following statement to Vienna:

We are standing loyally behind our ally and therefore have the right to be informed as to his [Aehrenthal's] intentions, in order not to be confronted with surprises. We have heard all kinds of things from third parties about Aehrenthal's maneuvers in the Turkish situation; we must receive official notice of these. Otherwise, we shall be told some day by the other powers that we had refused to advise Austria-Hungary to make concessions which had been proposed to her. We dare not allow ourselves to be put in such a false position.¹⁰

This pressure had the desired effect, and, with England using her influence in Constantinople, the Austro-Turkish agreement was completed and formally signed on February 26 of the new

⁵ Jaeckh, *Kiderlen-Waechter*, II, 11.

⁶ H. Rogge, ed., *Friedrich von Holstein Lebensbekenntnis in Briefen an Eine Frau* (Berlin, 1932), pp. 328-329.

⁷ *O.-U. A.*, I, 452-453, 457.

⁸ *G. P.*, XXVI, 448-449. Reports had come to Berlin that Pallavicini was to be recalled. *O.-U. A.*, I, 513.

⁹ *G. P.*, XXVI, 455-456.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 459.

year. Turkey acknowledged the annexation, and received in return a money compensation, commercial advantages, and the renunciation of Austria's rights in the Sanjak.¹¹

With Turkey satisfied, Germany's next move was to get Serbia and Russia to accept the annexation, a more difficult task. Kiderlen's policy was based on the assumption that a stronger line would have to be taken to get the Slavic states to yield. Although he did not believe Russia would back Serbia's claims to the point of war, he advised the Austrians to minimize the danger from this source by enlisting Bulgaria on their side. Not only would this divide Russian sympathies, but Bulgaria would be an effective counterweight against Serbia.¹² Military preparations, too, were in order, for Serbian nationalism was rising. Therefore, when Aehrenthal suggested that Conrad and Moltke, the chiefs of the Austrian and German staffs, exchange views on a possible European conflict, Buelow and Kiderlen agreed. Because Italy could not be relied on, an opinion confirmed by Count Monts from Rome, Kiderlen advised that she be left out of the conversations.¹³ By an exchange of letters, the military chiefs implemented their alliance with plans for cooperation in case of war with Serbia and Russia.

Throughout the crisis Kiderlen stubbornly refused every proposal for coercing Austria to appease Serbia by a territorial or other compensation. Moreover, in his opinion, Austria should not agree to a conference unless acceptable conditions were guaranteed beforehand.¹⁴ When Jules Cambon, the French ambassador, suggested that France and Germany offer their services in St. Petersburg and Vienna respectively, Kiderlen advised rejection. "We have no cause," he said, "to influence our ally for mediation, nor is there any reason for helping Izvolski out of his embarrassing situation."¹⁵ A similar proposal by England was likewise refused. Kiderlen told Cambon and Goschen, the British ambassador, that action for liquidating the crisis should be taken at Belgrade rather than at Vienna, especially since the provocation was coming from Serbia. This action, he predicted, would be more effective if all of the powers, especially Russia, would participate.¹⁶ France and England were unwilling

¹¹ *O.-U. A.*, I, 886; G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, ed., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (London, 1927-1937), V, 638-639; cited as *B. D.*

¹² *Ibid.*, I, 530. Bulgaria had used this opportunity to proclaim her independence.

¹³ *G. P.*, XXVI, 338-339.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 458.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 592.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 608.

to accept this procedure; on the other hand, they refused to support Serbia's claims to territorial compensation, and advised the Russians to do likewise.¹⁷ Despite Izvolski's irritation when the French ambassador presented Kiderlen's plan, Russia, nevertheless, counseled Serbia to renounce her territorial demands and to appeal her case to the powers.¹⁸

Kiderlen naturally hoped that Serbia would yield without further debate. If not, he believed a favorable solution could be forced, since Russia had not recovered from her war with Japan.¹⁹ This opinion was correct. The following week, a council of Russian ministers and generals decided that they were not prepared to intervene in the event of an Austro-Serbian conflict.²⁰ When the Serbs failed to include acceptance of the annexation in their note to the powers, the Germans began planning for the day when stronger action would be required.²¹ Resorting to the press, Kiderlen undertook to influence German opinion to this point of view.²² On being warned by Cambon that this chauvinistic press might cause trouble and create the impression that Germany did not care if war ensued, Kiderlen replied that this impression would be quite wrong, and concluded bluntly: "We certainly do not want war—as Russia would be sure to get a beating and that would mean a revolution followed by a republic. That would not suit our book at all. Especially as we are not ready for one ourselves yet."²³ Climaxing the war of nerves, Austria dispatched fifteen battalions to her southern frontier;²⁴ for Aehrenthal, too, had judged the Serbian note unacceptable.²⁵

At this point the Russians unwittingly afforded Buelow and Kiderlen the opportunity to intervene more directly to effect a solution favorable to the Central Powers. On March 14, Count Osten-Sacken, the Russian ambassador, asked the Chancellor to advise Aehrenthal against publishing the documents pertaining to the original bargain. Izvolski did not want France and England to know that he had agreed to the annexation in return for a promise of support for opening the Straits to Russian warships.

¹⁷ B. D., V, 637-638; B. De Siebert and G. A. Schreiner, ed., *Entente Diplomacy and the World* (New York, 1921), pp. 231-232.

¹⁸ B. D., V, 627-628; Siebert, *Entente Diplomacy*, pp. 235-236.

¹⁹ Jaech, *Kiderlen-Waechter*, II, 25.

²⁰ G. P., XXVI, 672; O.-U. A., II, 120; Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908-1909* (Cambridge, 1937), pp. 188-189.

²¹ G. P., XXVI, 651, 652-653; B. D., V, 672, 673.

²² E. M. Carroll, *Germany and the Great Powers 1866-1914* (New York, 1938), p. 622; B. D., V, 673.

²³ B. D., V, 678.

²⁴ G. P., XXVI, 657, 659; O.-U. A., II, 115.

²⁵ O.-U. A., II, 79-80.

Buelow consented to mediate on condition that Izvolski would advise Serbia to be quiet.²⁶ With Kaiser's approval, Kiderlen then drafted the German plan for liquidating the crisis. First of all, the powers should ratify the annexation by an exchange of notes with Vienna. Russia would then advise the Serbs to accept the annexation. Should Izvolski refuse this procedure and continue to withhold recognition, the Germans stated that they would have to let matters take their course.²⁷ From Austria's point of view, the German plan seemed adequate. It provided for recognition of the annexation without a conference of the powers, and at the same time, it deprived Serbia of legal grounds for hoping that the *fait accompli* would be overturned.²⁸

The Russians were not ready to accept the German plan unconditionally. Izvolski still desired a guarantee that a conference would be held to pass upon the annexation.²⁹ He was indeed in a tight spot. Acceptance would mean defeat and humiliation for Pan-Slavism everywhere; refusal would leave the threat of an Austro-Serbian war. His answer to the Germans was, therefore, conciliatory and conditional.³⁰ The Kaiser was extremely critical of the tone and content of the document,³¹ and Kiderlen told Szoegyeny, the Austrian ambassador, that he believed Buelow would force Russia to give a clear and precise answer.³² This opinion was not mere speculation, for the minister was probably then composing the note which forced Izvolski to yield. On March 21, Pourtales, the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, was instructed as follows:

Tell Izvolski that we learn with satisfaction that he recognizes the friendly spirit of our proposal and appears willing to accept it. You will then inform M. Izvolski that we are ready to propose to the Austro-Hungarian government that it should ask the powers, on the basis of the Austro-Turkish agreement already communicated to them, to consent to the elimination of article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. But before we make this proposal to Austria-Hungary, we must know definitely that Russia will give an affirmative answer to the Austrian note and will declare, without any reservation, her formal agreement to the abolition of article 25. Your Excellency will therefore tell M. Izvolski in a positive manner that we expect a precise answer—yes or no. We shall have to

²⁶ G. P., XXVI, 669; Bernhard von Buelow, *Memoirs of Prince von Buelow* (Boston, 1932), II, 447.

²⁷ G. P., XXVI, 670.

²⁸ Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York, 1939), I, 388-389. Schmitt believes the Germans were sincere in wishing to build a bridge for Russia's retreat. *Annexation of Bosnia*, pp. 187-188.

²⁹ Siebert, *Entente Diplomacy*, p. 255.

³⁰ G. P., XXVI, 691-692.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² O.-U. A., II, 155.

consider any evasive, conditional, or unclear answer as a refusal. We would then draw back and let matters take their course; the responsibility for all further events would then fall exclusively on M. Izvolski, after we have made a final sincere attempt to help M. Izvolski clear up the situation in a manner acceptable to him.³³

The purpose of the note is clearly revealed in Kiderlen's own comments. Writing to a friend, he said: "I have finally succeeded in having clear and plain language used with Izvolski. The Chancellor today signed my note to Pourtales at St. Petersburg for Izvolski."³⁴ Later, when Kiderlen became permanent head of the foreign office, he boasted to Take Jonescu, a Rumanian minister: "I knew the Russians were not ready for war, that they would not go to war in any case, and I wanted to make what capital I could out of this knowledge. I wished to show them that Germany, which had been in Russian strings since 1815, was now free of them. Never would Schoen and Co. have ventured to do what I did on my own responsibility."³⁵ Since Kiderlen's position was hardly of more importance than that of an undersecretary, obviously he was exaggerating. In the last analysis, William and Buelow bore the responsibility for Germany's policy.

Unquestionably Kiderlen was guilty of rattling the sword, but, since his note contained no time limit, it was hardly an ultimatum.³⁶ With no other avenue open, the Russians accepted the German proposal.³⁷ Then Kiderlen sounded London, Paris, and Rome for their approval of the Austro-Turkish agreement and for their recognition of the annexation.³⁸ With victory in sight, he now advised Aehrenthal not to accept a conference of the powers.³⁹ On England's withholding her consent to this arrangement,⁴⁰ Kiderlen informed London that Serbia would never yield until the annexation had been recognized by the powers. Furthermore, should Germany's plan be abandoned, he warned that she would refuse to accept the responsibility for further events.⁴¹ On the following day, Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, informed the Austrians that England would cooperate with the other powers in the overture to Belgrade.⁴² Grey, how-

³³ G. P., XXVI, 693-695; Schmitt, *Annexation of Bosnia*, pp. 194-195.

³⁴ Jaechh, *Kiderlen-Waechter*, II, 26.

³⁵ Take Jonescu, *Some Personal Impressions* (London, 1919), p. 58.

³⁶ Schmitt, *Annexation of Bosnia*, pp. 196-197.

³⁷ G. P., XXVI, 702-703.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 703-704.

³⁹ O.-U. A., II, 187.

⁴⁰ B. D., V, 739; G. P., XXVI, 707-708.

⁴¹ G. P., XXVI, 708-709.

⁴² B. D., V, 746-747; O.-U. A., II, 203.

ever, did not answer the stiff German note, an omission which greatly displeased the Chancellor.⁴³

After the great powers had acted in concert in Belgrade, Serbia agreed to comply with their decision on the annexation. In addition, she promised to live on good relations with Austria and to restore her army to its normal footing.⁴⁴ Because this statement of promises contained no guarantee for Serbia's future conduct, Kiderlen personally deemed it inadequate. He could not shut his eyes to the possibility that the Serbs might sometime commit an act which would provoke Austria to war, and he told Goschen that, had he been in Aehrenthal's place, he would never have consented to a formula which contained no guarantee for the future. The minister would have preferred that Germany had incurred no responsibility for the action in Belgrade.⁴⁵

The issues raised by the annexation were now all but settled. Thanks to Germany's support, a policy inaugurated by Bulow and forcefully executed by Kiderlen, Austria gained two more indigestible Slavic provinces. Yet this diplomatic victory was both costly and brief, for the passions aroused and the commitments made did much to prepare the ground for World War I. A peaceful solution of the crisis was effected because Russia was unwilling, at this time, to support Serbia to the end. Furthermore, after pouring cold water on Izvolski's aspirations for opening the Straits, France and England had restrained their associate. The Triple Entente was not yet "Balkanized." In forcing a solution of the crisis, Germany had acted also for peace. Austria and Russia might have let matters rest until Serbia had committed an act which would have brought war sooner.

In subscribing to the principle that Germany's security rested on the preservation of Austria, the ally, Kiderlen realized that an element of risk was incurred. To minimize this danger, he counseled his government to remain the master and not the servant of the alliance.⁴⁶ This would suggest that, whenever the pull from Vienna became too great, the ally would have to be restrained. At one point in the crisis, Buelow incited Austria against Serbia and Montenegro.⁴⁷ The documents reveal no similar advice from Kiderlen; however, his activity during the whole crisis convinced Szoegyeny that he was one of Austria's strongest

⁴³ *O.-U. A.*, II, 208.

⁴⁴ *O.-U. A.*, II, 225; *G. P.*, XXVI, 731.

⁴⁵ *B. D.*, V, 765.

⁴⁶ Jaeckh, *Kiderlen-Waechter*, II, 11.

⁴⁷ *O.-U. A.*, I, 606-611.

supporters in the German foreign office.⁴⁸ This pattern of encouraging and, at times, restraining Austria was followed by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Kiderlen again during the first Balkan War of 1912, and finally by Bethmann and Jagow in July, 1914. The German people are well aware of the consequences.

⁴⁸ *O.-U. A.*, II, 314.

THE TEACHING OF HIGH SCHOOL HISTORY—A POINT OF VIEW

LUCIA DANIEL

I

The purpose of this paper is to present a point of view to be considered by those who have a part in the preparation of prospective high school teachers of history. It is not intended as a treatise on what preparation or how this preparation should be given to these teachers in the making. The point of view to be discussed is (1) what product should result from teaching history in high school and (2) how these results may be secured. This teaching should influence the pupils in what they do, how they react to what others do, and how well they live. A thorough knowledge of history may in no small degree contribute to this living, but this knowledge alone may have little or no effect. There also should be an understanding of the facts whereby ideals and attitudes may be guided. Furthermore, both the understanding and the knowledge will function as desired when the pupils and their purposes are understood and given consideration. Altogether this is a complicated order, but one deserving attention of those who even remotely have a part in the preparation of high school teachers.

As for the pupils, no longer do we have the situation once prevalent when approximately three out of four high school graduates went to college. Today about three out of every four in a high school graduating class do not go on to college. We are aware that today we are approaching "general education". We are reaching the point where all of the boys and girls attend high school. The problem created by this growth has given us pupils with varying interests, outlooks, ideas, and vocational futures—all resulting in the dilemma of "universal high school education" or "selected high school education". Whether we like it or not, "universal education" is being forced upon us. The children are in school, and laws will not permit their elimination. Parents demand, state and nation encourage, politicians and many "respectable" educators insist that the high school serve all, irrespective of color, creed, ability, or interest. Thus a single point of view as to course offerings or curriculum opportunity is to make a fiasco of the whole business.

In the past and in the present, many college or university administrative groups have considered secondary education

largely in terms of how best it could prepare pupils to meet college or university entrance requirements. It is chiefly in the last generation that secondary schools have been able to break away from rigid university and college controls. The newer emphasis upon vocational training and general education are being given a status equal in rank with that older emphasis upon the college course.

The chief purpose of the high school in the United States is to prepare its pupils, whether they graduate or not, for citizenship responsibilities—to give them an understanding of their obligations and duties in the adult world. Therefore, there should be a general program of education for all pupils with specialized programs in which those of special ability will have the opportunity for developing their specialty. One such group would be the college preparatory pupils, but they would be only *one* such special group.

Only about one-third of the boys and girls who enter our secondary schools graduate, and of those who graduate, only about one-fourth to one-third go to college. This ratio will probably increase in time. We must admit that while we do have a real obligation to the special college preparatory group, we have a far more pressing obligation to those who enter high school but leave before graduating and do not go to college. Since America's very future depends upon its educational system, it is imperative that we realize the need for a realistic citizenship training program leading to a full life of civic responsibility.

In our American schools we do much to teach the theory of democracy but too little to train pupils in habit and attitudes which will make them useful members of society. The school, next to the home, is held responsible for the abilities, interests, habits, attitudes, and traits which high school boys and girls attain by the time they leave school, whether as graduates or not.

It is generally assumed that the State supports public education not only to give instruction in formal subjects however important these are, but, also to prepare boys and girls for the life they will find beyond school. Will they have the knowledge, the attitudes, and the interests which will help them deal with the problems which will confront them soon after they leave school? Social competence is an essential outcome of public education, and in the words of Dr. Francis Spaulding, Commissioner of Education of New York State, our schools ought "to be judged not so much by whether they succeed in 'covering' certain predetermined subjects as by their success in develop-

ing socially significant abilities and in leading boys and girls to want to put those abilities to use".¹

The schools' effort to equip young people for citizenship should not stop with seeing that pupils "know the facts", for equally important are respect for the rights which democracy guarantees, and a concern that democratic government shall succeed. Hence, the schools' duty is two-fold: namely, to teach boys and girls the facts with which they need to be acquainted and to awaken in them a willingness to sacrifice personal interests and comforts in the promotion of fairness and the general welfare.

Since high school boys and girls are the future adult members of our society, it is important to ascertain whether or not they possess the qualities which will make them ready to meet the responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic state. This demands more than the important duties of voting, paying taxes, and obeying the law. It includes ability to get along with family, neighbors, and associates. We need young men and women who feel an urge to correct undesirable conditions in their communities, who understand the meaning of democracy and are loyal to its principles.

Where does the teaching of high school history fit into this scheme? Many claim that history should make better citizens, and true it may, but knowledge of history alone may not do this unless ideals, attitudes, and habits are understood in terms of activity. More than imparting knowledge is necessary to an understanding. Do our schools give our young people a chance to develop the kinds of social competence needed to make them good citizens and successful workers? Do our schools teach directly and systematically about our own local communities and encourage young people in any significant thinking about fundamental out-of-school social problems?

It seems that a primary reason for the lack of success among young people in meeting these problems lies in the fact that the high schools give them insufficient chance to master important abilities which the world beyond school will require of them as citizens, taxpayers, and voters. The present educational program has supplied much academic information, but has neglected to give pupils pertinent knowledge concerning immediate problems and issues in their local communities, their opportunities for making a living, or the educational possibilities open to them when they leave school.

¹ Francis T. Spaulding, *High School and Life* (New York, 1938), p. 4.

Legislatures and State Boards of Education have prescribed history, American history, as a requirement for high school graduation. By implication, this course falls in the category of general education rather than specialized, since all have to take it. There is little opportunity for specialized history in high school. To prospective teachers, this must be clearly understood. While there are those who prepare for a life of historical scholarship, of equal or greater urgency is the teaching of those who desire and need only elementary knowledge of history; these are numbered in the thousands while future historians are numbered in tens. History knowledge is important to be sure, but from this point of view, it is a means to an end, but cannot serve unless it becomes part of the end as well as the means.

The prospective teacher must be a scholar, but more than a scholar, he must be an educator. The content of high school history courses is largely controversial. These issues must not only be known but they must be understood. So-called "dead issues" are often not dead at all; for example, the "lost cause" now raises its head again in the "states' rights" movement.

Even though the history of former times is necessary to a proper understanding of the present, such study is not sufficient enough to equip citizens of today with the knowledge and attitudes which they must have in order to possess a sympathetic understanding of our complex and constantly changing world, the future of which they will help to shape. Contemporary events must be studied as a means of developing lively and intelligent interest in world affairs.

It has been only a few years since numerous educators spoke with admiration and mingled jealousy of the results which the Nazis in a few short years had achieved in indoctrinating the German youth in ideals and ideas of Nazism. The zeal found in Germany and in Italy and today in communist-dominated lands goes along with an authoritarian society, not one of which is democratic. Young people can be moved to a high state of excitement by the preparation for war or the prospect of conquering an enemy, but youth will not manifest these outward demonstrations of zeal in a society which emphasizes the conquering or solving of common problems. Such is our democratic society. Our greatest hope in America lies, not in an attempt to stimulate an artificial excitement about national objectives, but rather in the attempt to interest more and more people in the job of doing their civic duty.

II

Where will the schools fit into this plan to promote a continuous and effective interest in the performance of civic duties? How are pupils to be encouraged to concern themselves with the problems of the day which call for informed and thoughtful consideration?

If today's schools are to perform their full responsibility to the young people under their direction, they must face two important factors: what shall we teach and how shall we teach, in other words, content and method. Not only must there be real constructive thinking on these two problems, but more important, action must follow—action in directing these young learners in straight thinking about the "American" way of life, and in helping them to grow into informed, thoughtful, responsible citizens. This cannot be done effectively unless we permit the examination of controversial issues in our schools. Controversy is a vital part of our democratic way of life and hence such issues belong in the school. One often hears people say that some issues are not controversial, which is to say, not subject to different interpretations. This in itself is an issue. Too often, when differences become significant and controversy takes on a fundamental nature, people become faint-hearted and wish to protect the young from such situations.

Contemporary problems do belong in the classroom, but should not be dumped there. It is wrong for pupils to be made to feel that life is simple and peaceful so long as they study the three r's or even geography and history, but on rare or infrequent occasions it becomes exciting when they study issues. Just as issues permeate the entire sphere of life, so they should permeate the curriculum.

The American government and our American people are daily forced to deal with a large number of important questions—domestic and foreign. Under our system of government, a citizen cannot escape the obligation of meeting these issues. Whether it is the opinion expressed, the vote cast, or the cause supported, he is helping to create public opinion and to shape programs for action. Even when a citizen ignores an issue, he is helping to determine the outcome. The more of this group we have, the easier it is for a relatively small but highly organized pressure group to further its interests and to realize its solutions and objectives.

Our American way of life demands a dynamic, changing society. If a democracy is to survive as a democracy, it must ex-

pect, anticipate, and welcome orderly changes, political, social, and economic. History has shown us that if such change is not possible through avenues of open discussion and the free ballot, it will then come by violent revolution. Since proposed or developing changes will precipitate controversy, democracy must provide skills and machinery for its citizens to think intelligently and express judgment concerning controversial topics.

In our democracy, the school is regarded as the chief agency for the development of skilled, well-informed people and for the reconstruction of values. The school should provide for the realistic induction of young citizens to the methods of arriving at rational discussions about live issues which must be solved by popular will or consent. No other agency of society even approaches the school in ability to perform this function. The one universal institution in which democratic habits may be acquired by all is the public school. There is no better place for young people to prepare to meet real life decisions.

It has been necessary to deal with content and method separately, but this is not intended to imply that they are separate. Let there be no conflict between content and method. Both are involved if we teach at all. Moreover, a third element is the pupil, his maturity, his intelligence, and his viewpoint. Any content or method attempted without a recognition of the persons to be taught will result in a hit and miss procedure with chance results. Perhaps this is not bad for the exceptional pupil who may get along somehow without a teacher, but it is bad for pupils in general. What method then is best to follow in teaching history classes?

Problems and issues of present-day life have a tendency to be more meaningful, more alive, and of greater importance than those of other days. This is primarily true since contemporary problems are in the process of solution while past controversies, whether solved or unsolved, have lost much of their interest.

When American history courses are organized around or are permeated with present-day problems, America's past is made meaningful to the present—for example, in foreign relations we have the conflict between nationalism and internationalism; and the Civil War gives insight into the current struggle between agriculture and industrialism. Learning should be directed toward a living problem, not old and cold topics.

One needs not argue the importance of teaching debatable subjects. In teaching public problems one is bound to tackle something controversial, for that always happens in a democracy

when important questions come up for settlement. Out of these conflicts of opinion come compromises which are eventually enacted into law.

In much of the subject matter of current history, pupils simply acquire information for there is nothing to debate, but when the controversial questions do arise, they should not be dodged but should be dealt with frankly. A teacher should make certain that the pupils understand the importance of and reason for considering these issues, and he should know how to hold the confidence of his class, even though considering some problems and declining to consider others.

There are numerous criteria for judging a controversial issue which may be studied in the classroom. These range from whether it is timely and interesting to whether it is relevant to the course in history and acceptable to the community as appropriate for school study.

Assuming that a problem has been selected for study, what then becomes the teacher's part? While acting as the chairman or moderator, the teacher needs to do an expert job of *defining the question* at hand and of directing the discussion of the class to these concrete points. Further, the discussion must be kept to the points at issue until an opportunity for decision has been reached even if different points of view persist, or, in other words, until further argument carries no evidence. This is a hard task, for the tendency in pupil as well as in adult discussion is to drift away from the definite problem under consideration. The teacher has an additional responsibility of developing skill in handling the timid as well as the loquacious pupil, and of knowing how and when to bring the discussion to a close. Parenthetically, a teacher may express a point of view provided he makes it clear that it is not to be forced on others, and is stated as a point of view and not as a fact. To the facts, the pupils and teachers should agree. In this way a lesson in distinguishing between fact and opinion is learned, for conflicting opinions should be examined in a calm and rather analytical way. Thus by the time a pupil leaves high school, he should be fairly competent in the appraisal of opinion. He has a greater preparation for the adult responsibility of making tentative conclusions in the light of evidence and consistent with democratic principles and of keeping currently informed and standing ready to revise these tentative conclusions and to pursue a different course of action if new evidence is uncovered.

It is desirable for a teacher to express his own opinions very seldom for pupils are inclined to accept his analyses as

those of authority, particularly on issues where pupils have not already developed opinions. Even if a teacher tells his pupils that what he has said represents only his own point of view, his opinions will carry great weight and pupils will be inclined to follow his lead unless the question being discussed has to do with party politics. In such matters pupils are greatly influenced by what they hear at home and elsewhere.

In our American education, we may expect our pupils to be indoctrinated in favor of democracy, thus we do not want them to get the idea that, whenever a difficult problem arises, they can expect someone else to give them the answers. If these young people are to display independence in years to follow, they should acquire the habit of free thought and decision while they are in school. The duty of the teacher is to see that pupils know the admitted facts, and that they are familiar with a variety of opinions.

Let it not be assumed that this point of view carries the idea that just any teacher is capable of directing or guiding pupils in issue-discussions, for frequently issue-minded teachers are highly emotional individuals. Any teacher who guides affectively the study of issues must first search out the numerous facts required in order to understand the problem. This fact-finding procedure is rather laborious, but it is essential to know which facts have been tested, which are pure assumptions, which have been tainted with propaganda, or which facts are missing. Only after this can one begin discussing solutions. In a democracy issues of State do rest eventually upon the will and content of the governed, so there are no issues which are not quite properly the business of public education.

We are living in a period of suspicion, fear, and extremism, and many voices are raised against any realistic study of today's problems in the classroom. One charge against public schools is that teachers are trying to indoctrinate pupils with their own ideas—freedom through indoctrination, one might call it. However, if a teacher acts as a moderator, brings in all facts, permits freedom of discussion, and lets pupils form their own opinions or conclusions, then he indoctrinates possibly—but through freedom.

III

The preparation of teachers to meet the "general education" trend is of importance to each of us. It is highly desirable that research be included in the preparation for teaching, but research alone is not enough. A prospective teacher must know

who are to be taught. Familiarization or acquaintance with pupils, their environments, former schooling and future plans is important.

A teacher should know *what to teach*—that is, the teacher should be capable of selecting appropriate content from a store of material: herein is the importance of scholarship for the teacher. Will the content be appropriate for the pupils who are taught? Will it consist of memorizations of names and dates or will it emphasize skills in the interpretation of data, application of principles, evaluation of sources, and ability to generalize?

A teacher should know *how to arouse the pupil's interest in history.* There should be a constant effort to show the connection between history and the events of our times. While the chronological approach is important, the horizontal approach is equally important. A pupil should be given an opportunity to discover how his own country looks to other nations, and to learn that relations between nations are in reality relations between human beings.

A glance at any daily newspaper or any of the current magazines will reveal the wide range of domestic and foreign topics demanding the attention of an enlightened citizenry. A teacher should know *how to encourage pupils to read widely*, and to listen to newscasts and radio commentators. Keeping informed is a habit which should be developed in school. A teacher through encouraging leisure-time reading can help develop these habits which will carry over into adult life.

The teaching of history has a greater significance when the end result for the pupil is a healthy attitude toward the democratic way of life. The record of the struggle to make life more livable—or for a better world—is filled with color, drama, and pathos. History teachers who understand their business constantly relate whatever history they are teaching to the story of their own land, and refuse to allow history teaching to be mere presentation of the dry bones of the past. In interpreting the character and contributions of some outstanding leaders of the past, a teacher will not only familiarize himself with the age and times in which these famous leaders lived, but will investigate all the sources that help to shed light on their personalities and accomplishments. History teachers want it to be more than interesting; they wish it to be vital, with direct relationship to the present and to current problems and issues. There should be a constant drawing upon current sources in illustrating points, and for purposes of comparison.

A teacher is not a "preacher", nor is his proper function that of a moralizer. In teaching history for democratic attitudes, one cannot expect to gain results in a day, a week, or a month. The value of the teacher's work will eventually be measured in years to come when the pupil takes his place as an adult citizen prepared to promote through active participation a more vital democracy due to his deep social consciousness.

It ought to be a school's responsibility to discover the kinds of education its pupils most need and to provide appropriate education for each of them. There is obviously one chief reason for the lack of social competence among young people just out of high school. It goes back to the schools' failure to give pupils an opportunity to acquire many of the attitudes and abilities which the out-of-school life will demand of them.

The soundest means of a high school's effectiveness is an estimate of how its pupils behave outside of school as citizens, workers on jobs, members of families, and dependable, self-respecting people. The ability to deal with issues cannot be acquired solely from books, or from the history of problems that have stirred people in the past, but from direct experience with that type of job or problem.

At the present our high schools are for the most part performing only a limited educational job, and do not need to restrict themselves to this limited job which most of them are doing. They should be preparing pupils for active and responsible citizenship. "This means much more than seeing that their graduates are acquainted with the facts of United States history and the structure of our national Government. It will mean giving our pupils a vivid appreciation of the natural resources, the kinds of people, the institutions, the customs and traditions, and the ways of living that make up the United States, especially the United States of today, in contrast with the other major nations of the world. It will mean bringing them face to face with important problems for which their towns, their state and their nation are seeking a solution . . ."² It will encourage them to take an active part—even though not eligible to vote—in getting things done which are desirable for their communities. It is to be hoped that it will discourage that all-too-rapidly growing attitude that "lets George do it".

In conclusion, a prospective teacher in addition to being a good student with superior scholarship, should know his history, should be familiar with his pupils, should know when to teach

² Francis T. Spaulding, "What Kind of High School Do You Want," *Ladies Home Journal*, August 1948, p. 169.

history, and the purposes for which the content will be studied. To those who are helping to prepare teachers of history, if research is the interest of the student, perhaps he should be encouraged to become a college professor or a research specialist, not a high school teacher, whose duties go far beyond research. One should keep in mind that there are those interested in the study of history for the purpose of enlightening themselves and for the purpose of raising the general intelligence of our citizenship. These should be encouraged to develop their competency in history. From these may come the teachers.

SOUTH CAROLINA COTTON MILLS AND THE TILLMAN MOVEMENT

GUSTAVUS G. WILLIAMSON, JR.

I

Cotton mills in South Carolina stood poised for a surge of expansion in 1890. Already well established and growing in number and in scale of operations, they were setting the pace for the whole Southern cotton textile industry. Some discerning observers foresaw in this growing industry serious competition for the older New England mills in the immediate future.¹ Many solid advantages underlay this development but none was more crucial than comparative labor costs. As long as Southern mills were free to quarry the large stratum of cheap labor available among the region's rural population, they might offer increasing inducements to capital, especially outside capital. These bright prospects determined their resolute resistance to any efforts to interfere with their labor program.

Such efforts did come in South Carolina early in the nineties in the shape of agitation against cotton mills and demands for labor legislation. Their source was Ben Tillman's farmers' movement, which is revealingly epitomized as lacking in consistent reform purposes. Despite some typically Populist protests such as its clamoring against corporations, Tillmanism was shaped equally by contrary currents of agrarian conservatism and plain political opportunism. These were the forces exploited skillfully by the mill leaders to turn aside the threat of their enterprises and bring the Tillmanites to terms. Significantly, their victory perpetuated itself, for farmer politicians later repeatedly opposed labor and other social legislation.

Tillman became governor in 1890 on the crest of a wave of unrest swelling up in the past decade among the farmers of South Carolina. Falling cotton prices and a general agricultural depression were the immediate causes, yet ultimate responsibility lay with an old dilemma, a one-crop economy based on the lien system of agriculture credit.² Tillman knew the farmers' distress and capitalized on it to form a movement which captured

¹ "Future Location of the Cotton Industries," *The Social Economist*, I (May, 1895), 165.

² M. B. Hammond, *The Cotton Industry. An Essay in American Economic History. Publications of the American Economic Association*, I (New York, 1897), p. 197.

control of the state Democratic party in 1890.³ He created a victorious coalition of farmers and politicians, galvanized by his supreme talent for arousing a rabid popular following.

In the process Tillman directed the farmers' anger against the Conservative clique controlling the state government. They were so entrenched in the public offices, he charged, as to constitute an aristocratic "ring" based on their control of the larger cities and the general apathy of the voters. Although there is no evidence that Conservatives emulated practitioners of the "New Departure," such as Joseph E. Brown in Georgia, in exploiting political power to advance private business interests, they were fully identified with the wealthier classes in the towns.⁴ Consequently they were isolated from the rural majority of South Carolinians, and became targets, or scapegoats, for their resentments.⁵

Tillman's sweep of the state met bitter opposition from these Conservatives and two years in office served only to intensify the lines of division. In 1892, when he offered for re-election, his opponents replied with a ticket headed by John C. Sheppard, an Edgefield banker and former governor, and James L. Orr, a lawyer recently made president of the Piedmont Cotton Mill. Despite strenuous efforts to split Tillman's group and detach restless elements, the Conservatives failed to prevent another triumph for him.⁶

The men who ran the cotton mills were as a rule inclined to the Conservative side by family, social, and business ties. Charleston bulked large both in capital invested and in influence; and this city was the stronghold of anti-Tillmanism.⁷ Ellison Adger Smyth, president of Pelzer Mill, was originally from Charleston. His brother, Augustine T. Smythe, a corporation lawyer and director of Pelzer Mill, was a Conservative state senator from Charleston.⁸ Francis J. Pelzer, a Charleston cotton factor, held large amounts of stock at Newberry and Glendale Mills as well as Pelzer Mill.⁹ Most mill executives were lawyers, bankers,

³ Francis B. Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman*, *South Carolinian* (Baton Rouge, La., 1944), pp. 88-89.

⁴ C. Vann Woodward, *Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel* (New York, 1938), p. 66.

⁵ Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman*, pp. 79-80.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199. Orr was the son of the Reconstruction governor, James L. Orr.

⁷ Broadus Mitchell, *The Rise of the Cotton Mills in the South*. *Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Series XXXIX (Baltimore, 1921), p. 236; August Kohn, *The Cotton Mills of South Carolina*. 1907 (Charleston, S. C., 1907), p. 211.

⁸ William P. Jacobs, *The Pioneer* (Clinton, S. C., n.d.), pp. 21-22.

⁹ From the stock books of Glendale, Newberry and Pelzer mills.

or merchants—all anathema to Tillmanites.

In addition to their early repugnance for the social aspects of the turbulent farmers' movement, which threatened to array "class against class," these men were to experience more immediate apprehensions, for in 1892, their mills came under direct attack. Tillman introduced a new element into his campaign performances of the summer when he declared that the "issue is . . . whether people or corporations shall rule."¹⁰ He repeatedly flayed Sheppard and Orr as "representatives of corporate power," controlled by railroads like the Richmond and Danville. He boasted of his administration's action in increasing the valuations of corporations for tax assessments.¹¹

Tillman shifted his line of attack on Orr in a meeting at Greenville by charging him with being "president of a factory that is making men and women work thirteen hours a day."¹² Orr heatedly denied this, replying that Tillman did not "know what he is talking about" and was trying to arouse prejudice against factories as he had already against banks and railroads.¹³ Conservatives were on the defensive and cotton mill interests shared their plight during the campaign. A more serious threat arose at the fall meeting of the General Assembly in Columbia.

Early in the session a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives to regulate the hours of labor in cotton mills. This was no surprise. It had been a minor issue in the anti-mill agitations of 1892, and it had been foreshadowed by unsuccessful efforts at labor regulation in 1890.

These early attempts were the result of coincidental maneuvers by politicians to attract labor votes, arising spontaneously and unnoticed in several scattered mill counties. Representative Stanyarne Wilson, of the largest mill county, Spartanburg, emerged as legislative field general in 1890. His political candidacy had been first presented to the Spartanburg voters by the Democratic Club of Glendale, a mill precinct.¹⁴ This alliance appeared in the open when, on announcing intention to introduce a labor bill, Wilson presented petitions in its favor from the employees of Glendale, Whitney, Trough Shoals, and Clifton Factory Number One, all mills in Spartanburg County. Intentions of introducing identical bills were announced by Repre-

¹⁰ *Spartanburg Carolina Spartan*, August 10, 1892.

¹¹ *Columbia Daily Register*, August 5, 7, 24, 1892.

¹² *Columbia State*, April 19, 1892.

¹³ *Greenville News*, April 23, 1892; *Anderson Peoples Advocate*, April 25, 1892.

¹⁴ *Spartanburg Carolina Spartan*, August 6, 1890.

sentative John Gary Evans of Aiken County, backed by petitions from Graniteville, Langley, and Vaucluse mill operatives, and by Representative Coleman L. Blease of Newberry, with a petition from the workers in that county's cotton mill.¹⁵

These men early began to cooperate, for on November 28, 1890, Wilson's bill was introduced alone. It provided that no children under sixteen years of age be employed in cotton or woolen mills and that no women be employed in them for more than ten hours a day.¹⁶ Referred to the House Judiciary Committee, it soon was singled out as likely to be accepted.¹⁷ It headed off another ten-hour bill from Representative Fowler of Union County, to prevent employment of children under ten, which was tabled.¹⁸ From committee Wilson's bill emerged changed to provide nothing more than a limit of *eleven* hours daily on the labor of women and of children under sixteen in the mills.¹⁹ In this form it passed the crucial second reading in the House by a vote of 81 to 28 and went to the Senate on December 17.²⁰ It was killed when the Senate adopted an unfavorable report from its Judiciary Committee by a vote of 21 to 10.²¹

This decisive reversal of the carefully achieved House verdict was unexpected even among supporters of cotton mills. Obviously overestimating the prospects of Wilson's bill, the mill men had reacted with alarm. Representative Dean of Spartanburg County, who was also sponsored by the Glendale Democratic Club, was persuaded to present a number of petitions from citizens of the town of Spartanburg opposing "the ten hour system."²² Following this, a delegation of mill presidents descended on Columbia, headed by a group of six-footers appropriately called "the Big Four"—Ellison Smyth of Pelzer, Henry P. Hammett of Piedmont, John H. Montgomery of Spartan and Pacolet, and Dexter E. Converse of Clifton and Glendale.²³ They reached the agreement with Wilson and his group

¹⁵ *Journal of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina. Being the Regular Session Commencing November 25, 1890* (Columbia, S. C., 1891), pp. 41-42, 58-59; *Charleston News and Courier*, November 29, 1890.

¹⁶ *Journal of the House, 1890*, pp. 60-61; *Charleston News and Courier*, November 28, 1890; *Spartanburg Carolina Spartan*, December 5, 1890.

¹⁷ *Charleston News and Courier*, November 29, 1890.

¹⁸ *Journal of the House, 1890*, pp. 48, 108, 264-265, 323.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 323-324, 344.

²¹ *Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina Being the Regular Session Commencing November 25, 1890* (Columbia, S. C., 1891), pp. 277, 359, 296, 382-383.

²² *Charleston News and Courier*, December 30, 1892.

²³ Jacobs, *The Pioneer*, p. 30.

by which the ban on child labor was dropped and the limitation on both child and woman labor was raised to eleven hours.²⁴ After committee approval of this weakened version, Wilson unabashedly shepherded it through the House and then sent it on to its death in the Senate. There Senator Augustine T. Smythe revealed exactly how the game had been played when he declared that the present shape of the bill resulted from an argument by both sides to head off "stringent regulations." Despite his antipathy to labor legislation in principle, he would respect the agreement. Senator M. L. Donaldson of Greenville County revealed clearly the feeling of mill supporters further by stating:

there was now a chance to settle a matter that cropped up annually . . . it [was] unjust that the Senate should now try to undo an agreement in the absence of those who had come to the agreement.

Senator J. M. Bell of Aiken County assured the Senate that the manufacturing interests of his county were not opposed to the bill in that form. Prevailing majority sentiment, however, was presented by Senator J. B. Glenn of Anderson, who opposed such legislation on a matter which should be left to operatives and manufacturers, and by Senator Richard Dozier of Georgetown, who opposed it as paternalism in government notwithstanding "an agreement with a few mills."²⁵ Nevertheless, in 1892, it was the mills that bore the blame for the failure of the Wilson bill to become a law.

Wilson exploited the issue later in his successful bid for nomination as state senator from Spartanburg. In one speech he declared:²⁶

Go to the mines of Siberia and you will find more humanity shown to the convicts than in the factories of Spartanburg County. It is grinding human flesh into money.²⁶

More than one hundred workers at Pacolet Mill signed a statement endorsing this. The remainder of the successful slate of legislative candidates joined in and pledged to reduce mill hours to ten per day.²⁷ The response is best measured in terms of the general air of excitement in the county during the elections. It reached the frenetic point of widespread expectation of strikes in the Spartan Mill and other factories, which their newspaper

²⁴ *Charleston News and Courier*, December 4, 6, 1890; *Spartanburg Carolina Spartan*, December 10, 1890.

²⁵ *Charleston News and Courier*, December 23, 1890.

²⁶ *Spartanburg Carolina Spartan*, August 17, 1892.

²⁷ *Charleston News and Courier*, September 8, 1892.

supporter shrilly attributed to "the scholastic element in the county . . . [and] artful politicians."²⁸

No strikes occurred but in the November, 1892, session of the General Assembly came fulfillment of the promise of another ten-hour labor law proposal. Behind it again stood Wilson and John Gary Evans, now members of the Senate, a much more pliable body than its predecessor which Tillman had labeled "driftwood." Cole L. Blease supported it in the House, and was joined by Representative Benjamin F. Perry of Greenville.²⁹ The bill itself was brought up by Representative Josh Ashley, a prosperous but illiterate farmer and lesser Tillmanite from Anderson County.³⁰

Ashley's proposal provided a maximum legal day's work in the state's cotton and woolen manufacturing establishments of ten hours and a weekly load of sixty hours, with makeup for lost time to the extent of one hundred ten hours.³¹ No mention of child or woman labor was included. It reached the Judiciary Committee hearings to be met by another delegation of mill presidents headed by "the Big Four," the late President Hammett's place being well filled by his successor at Piedmont, J. L. Orr, who stood over six feet. A stormy session produced agreement on terms increasing the limit of hours to eleven per day and sixty-six per week for all mill labor except engineers, mechanics, and clerical force. In this form it passed the House by a vote of 86 to 23, and went to the Senate.³² There it was guided through successfully by Senator Wilson despite real obstacles, such as the loss of the only copy of the bill's original draft. Wilson's Judiciary Committee reduced the overtime allowance to seventy hours a year.³³ Otherwise unchanged, the Ashley bill passed the Senate.³⁴

This law has later been judged a compromise on the basis

²⁸ Spartanburg *Carolina Spartan*, September 7, 1892.

²⁹ Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman*, pp. 196, 216. Perry was the son of the famous Unionist.

³⁰ Francis B. Simkins, *The Tillman Movement in South Carolina* (n.p., n.d.), p. 176.

³¹ *Journal of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina Being the Regular Session Commencing November 22, 1892* (Columbia, S. C., 1893), p. 58; *Charleston News and Courier*, November 25, 26, 1892.

³² *Journal of the House*, 1892, pp. 201, 318, 357, 359, 378.

³³ *Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina Being the Regular Session Commencing November 22, 1892* (Columbia, S. C., 1893), pp. 298, 365, 379, 385.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 387, 409, 410, 414, 490, 496; *Charleston News and Courier*, December 30, 1892. The full text is in *Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina Passed at the Regular Session of 1892*, part I (Columbia, S. C., 1892), pp. 90-91.

of the prevalent estimate of contemporary newspapers.³⁵ In a sense, such a characterization is plausible for both sides cooperated in fashioning the settlement. They did not, however, meet halfway; it was a strangely one-sided arrangement for a compromise. The final version was exactly what the mill men expected and labored to obtain.

As early as September, they had anticipated another attempt at labor legislation. Warned by the political canvasses of Wilson, Blease, Evans, and Perry, they also remembered the attempt of 1890. Correspondence began immediately to determine concerted steps of meeting the threat. J. L. Orr wrote to R. L. McCaughrin, president of Newberry Mill:

The Ten hour law will . . . be introduced, and in my judgment if we go to 11 hours, of our own motion, that will insure the passage of the Ten hour law, whereas, if we allow the matter to stand until the legislature meets, by petitions from our people for not less than 11 hours, and representations before the Committees, we can compromise on eleven hours.³⁶

A letter from President Ellison Smyth of Pelzer to McCaughrin advised:

if we ourselves reduce time we cannot in good faith reduce wages at the same time. We think it best to wait the action of the Legislature. Try to make the best possible terms, and with shorter hours come shorter pay.³⁷

Their chief concern was the possibility of a child labor law, as Orr revealed:

I do not dread the labor law for hours as much as I do for ages. A law prohibiting the working of children under 16 yrs. old, would increase the cost of production about 25%, and if the age were fixed at 14 the cost would be increased at least 10%. We do not work them under 12; but from 12 to 16 they make the best spinners and doffers and I don't see how we could get along in the Spinning room without that class.³⁸

His anxiety was founded in facts. Senator Wilson announced his intention of again introducing his 1890 bill to ban *child labor*.³⁹

The mill men's delegation to Columbia met with the sup-

³⁵ Columbia State, December 15, 1892. Compare Elizabeth F. Davidson, *Child Labor Legislation in the Southern Textile States* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1939), p. 90; "Report on Condition of Women and Child Wage-Earners in the United States," VI, *Senate Document*, 645, 61 Cong., 2 Session, p. 149.

³⁶ Orr to McCaughrin, September 29, 1892. (Orr and Smyth letters in manuscript used through the courtesy of Professor Lawrence B. Graves of Newberry College.) See also copies quoted *in extenso* in L. B. Graves, "The Beginnings of the Cotton Textile Industry in Newberry County," (University of South Carolina, M.A. thesis, 1947).

³⁷ Smyth to McCaughrin, September 28, 1892.

³⁸ Orr to McCaughrin, September 29, 1892.

³⁹ Charleston News and Courier, November 28, 1892.

porters of the labor bills and promised their support of a bill raised to eleven hours. Blease disclosed this to everyone's embarrassment in the Judiciary Committee hearings while upbraiding Smyth and Orr for bad faith in that they "agreed not to oppose the eleven hour bill." Actually the mill men spoke only to make clear for the record their objections to labor legislation in principle and reasons for confining the scope of the bill. Ashley announced the change of his bill so early as to be almost premature and climaxed the performance by then informing the committee that Senator Wilson had agreed not to introduce his child labor bill. On the floor of the House, Blease later angrily charged that the weakened bill "was written by a man who owns a factory," meaning Orr.⁴⁰

The mill men had headed off both child labor restrictions and a ten-hour law. Their triumph was due primarily to their own political realism. From the first they displayed remarkable acumen, not so much in anticipating the obvious threat, but in perceiving the chance for an understanding with the politicians. Eschewing doctrinaire predispositions and repressing their political antipathies, they effected a working arrangement with the Tillmanites. Their real achievement lay fundamentally in evaluating accurately the political forces with which they contended.

II

The reappearance of agitation for labor legislation in 1892 resulted from renewed efforts of certain politicians to create politically conscious blocs of supporters in the mill villages. Although they were all Tillmanites and Evans and Blease were leaders of the movement in the Senate and House respectively, these men did not have the unswerving support of the whole movement. Their legislative proposal never was included in its platforms. It is a mistake to assign responsibility for their interest in mill labor to Tillmanism in general, for there was little room for industrial workers in a movement of and for land-holding farmers.⁴¹

In 1892, however, the farmers were unusually responsive to fulminations against cotton mills. Smyth and Orr considered them in large measure the source and the object of the attacks. Their letters to McCaughrin stated:

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, December 6, 15, 1892; *Columbia State*, December 6, 15, 1892; *Columbia Daily Register*, December 6, 15, 1892.

⁴¹ William W. Ball, *The State that Forgot, South Carolina's Surrender to Democracy* (Indianapolis, Ind., n.d.), pp. 206-7, 209-10, 217, 223. Wallace, *History of South Carolina* (New York, 1934), III, 365-6.

back of this there is a wide spread feeling among the farmers that the factories are making a great deal of money and are taking and will continue to take their best tenants, by giving larger wages, than they can pay.

The farmers feel the Mills have taken their best tenants. The 'movement' now is to reduce wages to a parity with that of farm help. The agitation has not come from the mill people but from the 'movement.'⁴²

One large-scale landholder stated in the press: "I oppose cotton factories because the farmers cannot compete with them in the price paid for labor."⁴³

Competition for labor, then, accentuated a latent factor in rural areas—a "certain prejudice . . . against the mills and the operators." Now the flame was fanned by the men whom one newspaper denounced as "artful demagogues saying that the manufacturing companies are evil . . . and that they pay far too little for cotton when the price of cotton cloth is considered."⁴⁴

This attack probed close to the farmers' tenderest spot, particularly when falling cotton prices, ranging from 8 to 6.5 cents in the Piedmont, were compared with mill stock currently selling at premiums on the Charleston market.⁴⁵ Resentment still smoldered over the mills' action in suspending cotton buying during the debates on labor laws in 1890, and they threatened to renew this pressure in 1892.⁴⁶ Another form of pressure was even more serious—proposals in the General Assembly to extend the ten-hour day to farm laborers.⁴⁷ Though rejected, these served to emphasize the mixed reaction among Tillmanites. Many considered labor legislation paternalistic interference and were reluctant to accept it, whatever their grievances against mills.⁴⁸

Nowhere else do the fundamental contradictions inherent in Tillmanism stand out more vividly. Tillman's *raison d'être* politically had become in a large measure championing the people against corporations. But his movement was as short on sustained performance as it was long on promise. Expressing formless rural antagonisms, it did not develop a comprehensive re-

⁴² Orr to McCaughrin, September 29, 1892; Smyth to McCaughrin, September 28, 1892.

⁴³ *Charleston News and Courier*, August 27, 1892.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, September 10, 1892; *Greenville News*, April 14, 1902.

⁴⁵ *Charleston News and Courier*, September 1, 4, 8, 10, 12, 1892; *Greenville Mountaineer*, January 4, 1893.

⁴⁶ *Spartanburg Carolina Spartan*, December 5, 10, 1892; *Charleston News and Courier*, December 3, 29, 1892.

⁴⁷ *Spartanburg Carolina Spartan*, December 7, 1892.

⁴⁸ *Charleston News and Courier*, December 15, 1892.

form program for the dilemma of the agricultural state. Nor did it come close to being a genuine Populist or farmer-labor party. An instinctive conservatism remained beneath its surface of high excitement and sporadic cannonading to the left.⁴⁹

There were charges in 1892 that Ben Tillman was sponsoring a "leveling agrarianism . . . a coalition of the landless and homeless and moneyless."⁵⁰ But in retrospect he called his party "an agricultural movement . . . not an agrarian movement in any sense of the word."⁵¹ He certainly blunted the force of the Farmers Alliance in South Carolina by absorbing it after a long, uneasy courtship.⁵²

He was opposed in 1890 by an evanescent organization of "tenants and wage-earners" as the very symbol of a "landed aristocracy."⁵³ The railroad workers organized an Industrial Union in Columbia in 1892 with some tenant farmers against Ben Tillman and his "pack of ignorant farmers."⁵⁴ The feeling was mutual, for he told a delegation of railroad men that their "opposition does not amount to a damn compared with 50,000 or 60,000 farmers"⁵⁵ And, when faced with his widely quoted characterization of Graniteville mill workers as "that damned factory element," he failed to deny it convincingly, an indication of his lack of esteem.⁵⁶

In his inaugural speech in 1890, Tillman declared:

Corporations are not public enemies, although they are, if unbridled, apt to be oppressive . . . Therefore, we should carefully watch to see that nothing is done to injure our railroad or manufacturing companies . . .⁵⁷

And soon after his re-election he wrote, "Vested rights and investments of all kinds are as safe in South Carolina as they are anywhere."⁵⁸

Tillman's only overt attack on cotton mills as such in 1892 was based on their alleged injustice to *farmers* in paying only thirty-five dollars for a bale of cotton, the manufactured pro-

⁴⁹ Ball, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-7, 209-10, 217, 223; Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman*, p. 189.

⁵⁰ Spartanburg *Carolina Spartan*, August 17, 1892.

⁵¹ *Congressional Record*, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., XXXI, 3310.

⁵² Ball *op. cit.*, pp. 223-224; Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman*, pp. 205-206.

⁵³ *Charleston News and Courier*, July 4, 1890.

⁵⁴ *Columbia, Daily Register*, December 23, 28, 31, 1892; *Spartanburg Carolina Spartan*, January 4, 1893.

⁵⁵ Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

⁵⁶ *Columbia State*, August 16, 19, 31, 1892, *Columbia Daily Register*, December 16, 1892; *Charleston News and Courier*, October 3, 1892.

⁵⁷ *Journal of the House* 1890, p. 146.

⁵⁸ Tillman to Vander Lyles, May 16, 1893. (From Dr. F. B. Simkins' transcript of manuscript in Tillman Letter Book, 1892-1893.)

duct of which brought in seventy dollars.⁵⁹ In blandly seeking out damaging evidence of conditions in J. L. Orr's factory, he plainly was "politicking."⁶⁰ Otherwise he showed constant tolerance for cotton mills; he was a personal friend of the mill promoter, Daniel A. Tompkins, from whose company in Charlotte, North Carolina, he borrowed money in 1892.⁶¹ In the United States Senate he later gloated over South Carolina's textile growth, saying, "We built the mills . . . and we can beat all creation making the coarser fabrics."⁶²

The ranks of Tillman's movement contained many lawyers and professional politicians. No ideological inhibitions prevented these men from profiting from cotton mills. W. Christie Benet, Abbeville Tillman leader, subscribed substantially to the stock issue at the Newberry Mill in 1895.⁶³ D. K. Norris, an early associate, organized the Norris Cotton Mills with D. A. Tompkins.⁶⁴ Ira B. Jones, House Speaker, was an original director and stockholder in the Lancaster Mills in 1895.⁶⁵ Even Stanyarne Wilson admitted in 1890 that he was no enemy of factories *per se* but owned stock in several.⁶⁶ His moderation was expressed in the 1892 legislative debate by a supporter, Representative Foster of Spartanburg, "The factory labor bill . . . will give satisfaction to all parties concerned."⁶⁷ Such remarks demonstrated the anti-mill group's general willingness to find some arrangement acceptable to mill men that would pass as a vindication of campaign promises. Such opportunism produced neither labor politicians nor social legislation.

Despite these real limitations, however, the anti-mill "crusade" was no idle threat in 1892. At the same time that the mill men moved toward a *modus operandi* with the politicians they mustered their strength against internal disruption of their mills.

Frequent charges of political pressure of mills on workers punctuated the campaign. Wilson declared, "Men are deprived of the right to vote by these corporations."⁶⁸ J. L. Orr was

⁵⁹ Columbia State, May 4, 1892.

⁶⁰ Tillman to H. B. Buist, April 4, 1892. (Simkins transcript)

⁶¹ D. H. Tompkins to D. A. Tompkins, January 1, 1892. (Simkins transcript). D. H. Tompkins was Tillman's private secretary.

⁶² Congressional Record, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., XXXIII, 3213.

⁶³ From Newberry Mill stock list.

⁶⁴ George T. Winston, *A Builder of the New South, Being the Story of the Life Work of Daniel Augustus Tompkins* (Garden City, N. Y., 1920), p. 189.

⁶⁵ From Lancaster Mill stock list quoted in Elliott W. Springs, *Clothes Make the Man*, (privately printed), pp. 10-11.

⁶⁶ Charleston News and Courier, December 17, 1890.

⁶⁷ Spartanburg Carolina Spartan, December 21, 1892.

⁶⁸ Ibid., August 17, 1892.

forced to devote a good part of his oratory to denying political intimidations at Piedmont.⁶⁹ Even Tillman added fuel to the flame by reading an affidavit from one W. L. Snipes claiming to have been discharged from Pelzer Mill for attending a Tillman meeting.⁷⁰

The charge was met promptly by a telegram from President Smyth of Pelzer to Tillman: "The statement of Snipes is false . . . He voluntarily left the employ of the company." A simultaneous statement to the press, however, mentioned discharging other employees but for non-political reasons.⁷¹ This acknowledgment, echoed in similar statements from President Montgomery of Pacolet Mill, confirms the fact that men were being fired rather often with political implications attending.⁷² The very fervor of these denials bespoke a sensitive attitude just as did the apology of a pro-mill newspaper: "the employer has a perfect right not to employ hands that . . . may oppose any enterprise he may be running."⁷³

Whether they amounted to pressure or not, the really strong bids for political support by outstanding mill leaders were frequently successful. To an accompaniment of mass meetings, Conservative clubs, and such, the Sheppard-Orr ticket carried the following mill precincts: Anderson, Pelzer, Pendleton, Piedmont, and Newberry, and in Spartanburg County, Beaumont, Cowpens, Clifton, Enoree, Pacolet, Gaffney City, and Trough Shoals. The margin was only four votes at Pelzer; and the Tillmanite legislative nominees carried Clifton in spite of Tillman's loss, a split which was repeated at Pelham. The Tillman ticket carried the Horse Creek Valley mills, in Aiken County, such as Graniteville and Vacluse, and Glendale, Fingerville, Spartan Mills, and Whitney in Spartanburg.⁷⁴

Management attempted to offset any losses of political allegiance by stressing the value of loyalty between employee and employer. The Pelzer operatives held a mass meeting to protest the campaign charge that they were "tyrannically treated" and to express their affection for President Smyth; full newspaper coverage was obtained.⁷⁵ The fierce, individualistic pride of mill workers, so similar to that of farmers, was capitalized. A large

⁶⁹ *Greenville News*, August 15, 1892; *Columbia Daily Register*, August 14, 1892; *Columbia State*, July 30, 1892.

⁷⁰ *Columbia Daily Register*, August 14, 19, 1892.

⁷¹ *Columbia State*, August 16, 1892.

⁷² *Ibid.*, August 12, 1892.

⁷³ *Spartanburg Carolina Spartan*, August 31, 1892.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, September 7, 1892; *Columbia State*, August 31, 1892; *Charleston News and Courier*, September 1, 1892.

⁷⁵ *Anderson Peoples Advocate*, October 3, 1892.

group of Spartan Mill employees, for example, rebuked a Spartanburg politician for "reflecting upon our character as parents and citizens . . . and saying that we or our children are inhumanly treated by the managers."⁷⁶ Orr's statement to his workers that "our interests are identical" had its effect in the prevailing atmosphere of easy first-name cordiality.⁷⁷

Arguments of their self-interest also were paraded before the mill workers. An Enoree Mill employee warned his fellows that labor legislation was "a trap" to "reduce wages throughout the state" in mills.⁷⁸ As newspaper apologists expressed it, "It is a plain problem in arithmetic . . . Let the workers say whether they want the short hours and short pay or not."⁷⁹ They were reminded that they had "better schools and church facilities, more comforts, better food and clothing and much better society than they had on the farms."⁸⁰

Although the agitations of 1892 increased the permanent political consciousness of mill labor somewhat, they did not succeed in turning them against the leadership of their mills for long. Actually the effect was ultimately in the opposite direction since the anti-mill campaign hit labor as well as management. Inadvertently it increased the stigma of these workers and isolated them a bit further from the rest of the population, thus helping to make them more nearly a disciplined industrial proletariat in the factories and villages. At the same time an impetus was given to individualism that worked against class action or organization against employers or even further attempts at labor legislation.

Although the law of 1892 nullified contracts for excessive hours and provided fines of fifty to one hundred dollars for violators convicted in court, it had no real teeth. Court action was beyond the unaided means of mill workers. Lacking machinery for enforcement and supervision by the state, this sham openly invited evasion. As late as 1911, the state agency charged with enforcing the current mill hours law, unchanged in basic legal structure since 1892, described it as "so constructed as to make it absolutely impossible to ascertain whether there had been a violation of the intent and purposes of the law."⁸¹

⁷⁶ Spartanburg *Carolina Spartan*, August 17, 1892.

⁷⁷ *Greenville News*, April 14, 1902.

⁷⁸ Charleston, *News and Courier*, August 27, 1892.

⁷⁹ Spartanburg *Carolina Spartan*, August 31, 1892.

⁸⁰ Charleston *News and Courier*, September 8, 1892.

⁸¹ *Third Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industries, Labor Division, 1911* (Columbia, S. C., 1912), p. 4.

In early 1893 a Spartanburg newspaper observed:

The cotton mills are doing fairly well . . . There may be a little friction caused by the new factory law, but there will not be much trouble.⁸²

The mill processes continued smoothly as several changes were assimilated; piece rates were introduced more widely, and free rent on mill-owned houses was ended.⁸³ One condition remained unchanged, however, child labor, which was 26.7 per cent of the total work force in the mills of South Carolina in 1890, was 26.9 per cent in 1900.⁸⁴

The earlier trickle of outside capital began to widen into a flood. Throughout the state's textile industry opportunities for profit attracted more and more investments from local sources as well as the financial centers of the country. A note of warning to the legislature was sounded by the *Charleston News and Courier* in 1892: "If we begin now a policy of oppression, or even of undue interference with this industry, we shall drive it from the state . . ."⁸⁵ In 1895 an answer was presented by Mr. Jefferson Coolidge, a New England cotton manufacturer, testifying to a Massachusetts legislative committee concerning the rising threat of mills in the South. Their most important advantage lay in the constantly low labor costs; much of this he attributed to the fact that "Now they have no legislative difficulties . . ."⁸⁶ It was a remarkably accurate analysis, for the mills of South Carolina faced no labor legislation again until 1903.⁸⁷

⁸² Spartanburg *Carolina Spartan*, January 11, 1893.

⁸³ Graves, "Beginnings of the Cotton Textile Industry in Newberry County," p. 60; Daniel A. Tompkins, *Cotton Mill Commercial Features* (Charlotte, N. C., 1899), p. 118.

⁸⁴ "Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners," p. 46.

⁸⁵ September 10, 1892.

⁸⁶ Quoted in Edward Porritt, "The Cotton Mills in the South," *New England Magazine* XII (May, 1895), p. 577.

⁸⁷ "Report on the Condition of Woman and Child Wage-Earners," pp. 149-150.

THE PROBLEM OF NEGRO EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH

E. BASKIN WRIGHT

In the complex bi-racial society of the Southern States, nothing has been more fundamental than the proposition that the white and colored races should be segregated in educational institutions. This principle of segregation has been maintained from the lowest grades of the public schools through the most advanced graduate courses in the colleges. It is a principle which is contained in both the constitutions and the laws of the Southern States and is applicable to privately endowed schools or colleges as well as institutions supported by the state.

Typical of such legal requirements is the provision in the South Carolina Constitution of 1895 which states in Article eleven, Section seven: "Separate schools shall be provided for children of the white and colored races, and no child of either race shall be permitted to attend a school provided for the other race." Furthermore, Section 5377 of the Code of South Carolina provides: "It shall be unlawful for pupils of one race to attend the schools provided by boards of trustees for persons of another race." Such legal requirements are found in the constitutions and laws of all Southern States and several states bordering the South.

These legal bans on a mingling of the races in educational institutions have been repeatedly upheld by federal courts at all levels, including the Supreme Court of the United States with the proviso, however, that "substantially equal" educational facilities must be furnished to both races. The Supreme Court has been extremely liberal in interpreting the phrase "substantially equal" and has repeatedly winked at flagrant violations of the spirit of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This tendency on the part of the Federal Supreme Court to construe liberally the educational facilities offered to the two races and the apparent willingness of the Court to accept any type of education afforded by the Southern States so long as schools are actually open to both races, led to a feeling of security that the South would be left to develop its educational institutions in almost any manner it chose.

Any complacency which the South may have developed through the years on this score was rudely shattered, however,

in 1938, when the United States Supreme Court made an adverse ruling on the principle of segregation in institutions of higher learning. This ruling was handed down in the now famous case of *Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada*. Lloyd Gaines, a Negro, applied for admission to the Law School of the University of Missouri. He held a Bachelor of Arts degree from Lincoln University, a school for negroes maintained by the State of Missouri, and was fully qualified to enter the law school in so far as his academic training was concerned. However, he was denied admission to the University Law School solely upon the grounds that he was a negro. Under Missouri law segregation was maintained at all educational levels and the law provided for paying the out-of-state tuition of any Missouri negro to attend the schools of some other state where the course of study which he desired to pursue was not available to negroes in a state supported school in Missouri. Gaines refused to accept such an offer and brought suit in the federal district court. The case finally reached the United States Supreme Court and Chief Justice Hughes handed down the opinion of the Court in which he ruled that the negro was entitled to be admitted to the white law school in the absence of a state supported negro school providing similar educational opportunities.

In his opinion the Chief Justice stated: "The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. Manifestly, the obligations of the state to give the protection of equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality of legal rights must be maintained and the state was bound to furnish WITHIN ITS BORDERS facilities for legal education substantially equal to those which the state there afforded for persons of the white race"

While the Southern States were disquieted and disturbed by the decision in the Gaines case, the full implications of the case did not become apparent until eight or nine years later. Beginning in 1946 and continuing in 1947, 1948, and 1949, negroes began to apply for admission to the state supported white law schools in South Carolina, Oklahoma, Arkansas and other southern states and for courses in medicine, engineering and other studies which were not available in the state supported negro schools. This was no isolated Gaines case but a carefully planned program to break down the principle of segregation in the Southern States at the graduate school and professional school level. The chief instigator of the plan was the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and this

organization placed competent legal talent at the disposal of qualified negro students who were willing to offer themselves as guinea pigs in the interest of gaining equality for their race.

Thus, like a delayed action bomb, the full meaning of the Gaines case burst upon the consciousness of the Southern States and shattered what complacency may have remained after the Missouri decision. In South Carolina, John H. WRIGHTEN, a negro, applied for admission to the University of South Carolina Law School on July 2, 1946. His application was referred to President Norman M. Smith of the University who rejected the application four days later and a subsequent application to the Board of Trustees was also rejected. The only reason given for rejecting the applications was that WRIGHTEN was a negro and the Constitution and laws of South Carolina forbid both races to attend the same educational institution. A case arising out of a denial of admission to WRIGHTEN reached a hearing in the Federal District Court presided over by Judge J. Waites Waring in the summer of 1947 and Judge Waring followed the dictum of Chief Justice Hughes in the Gaines case and ruled in favor of WRIGHTEN. Judge Waring, in deciding in favor of the negro said: "The plaintiff, WRIGHTEN, is entitled to the same opportunity and facilities afforded to whites for obtaining a legal education by and in the State of South Carolina."

Faced with the alternative of establishing a law school for negroes, abolishing the law school for whites, or admitting the negro to the University Law School, the state opened a law school for negroes at Orangeburg which enrolled eight negroes in its freshman class in September, 1947, and has a current enrollment of twelve. Significantly absent from the first negro law class in the history of the State of South Carolina was John H. WRIGHTEN.

A similar action to the WRIGHTEN case involved Ada Lois Sipuel, a negro woman, who was denied admission to the Law School of the University of Oklahoma. The County Court and Supreme Court of Oklahoma had upheld the action of the University Board of Regents under Oklahoma's segregation law but the United States Supreme Court in a short and curt *per curiam* opinion reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma and went a step farther than either the Gaines or WRIGHTEN cases by ruling that the state had to furnish not only the negro a legal education but had to furnish it as quickly as it would furnish such an education to a white student. Oklahoma hurriedly opened a negro law school to which Ada Lois Sipuel

made no application for admission but instead petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel compliance with the Court's decision. The Court, however, dismissed the petition on the ground that the original writ of certiorari did not present the question of whether the state could satisfy the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a separate school for negroes, so on this question the Supreme Court has made no ruling.

The State of Arkansas met a similar situation by admitting a negro law student to the white University Law School and teaching him on a segregation basis in different classrooms. This plan was too much of a drain on the time of the teaching staff of the law school so the negro was then permitted to enter the classrooms occupied by white students, but with a wooden railing placed around his desk to simulate segregation. Student ridicule forced the University authorities to remove the railing and the student now attends classes on a complete basis of equality with white students. In September, 1948, the University of Arkansas also admitted a negro woman, on an unsegregated basis, to the University Medical School.

The repercussions of these various cases and the fear of others of a similar nature prompted the governors of the Southern States and some of the border states to face the problem and at a meeting of such governors in Tallahassee, Florida, in the spring of 1948, a plan for regional graduate and professional study was considered and approved by the governors of fourteen states. Under this plan, the Southern States and such border states as cared to participate would offer graduate and professional courses of study to citizens of both races on a regional basis utilizing the schools of the region but maintaining the principle of segregation.

The plan was presented to Congress for its approval since Article I, Section 10, Paragraph 3 of the Federal Constitution provides that: "No state shall, without consent of Congress, . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another state" In the United States Senate the plan met with the bitter opposition of negro leaders in committee hearings and never reached the floor for debate. Whether it will ever be approved by Congress or whether any further effort to secure congressional approval will be made is problematical since the leaders of the movement decided to go forward with the plan without such approval.

A permanent Regional Council for Education has been set up with a small staff in Atlanta and other meetings have

been held to plan the development of this regional program. A meeting was held at Savannah in December, 1948, and at this meeting it was agreed to go forward with the program in two fields, veterinary medicine and medicine. Under the regional plan for the study of veterinary medicine three white schools, the University of Georgia, Alabama Polytechnic Institute, and Oklahoma A. and M. College and one negro school, Tuskegee Institute, were designated as regional centers. The University of Georgia will provide training in veterinary medicine for the states of Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, West Virginia, and Virginia. Oklahoma A. and M. will serve Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas, while Alabama Polytechnic Institute, or Auburn, as it is more commonly known, will provide this training for students from Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee. All negro students in veterinary medicine will be trained at Tuskegee.

Under the plan, each state is allotted a quota. South Carolina's quota for white students at Auburn is 12 for each of the four classes. Its quota for negro students at Tuskegee is four for each class. This will mean a quota of twelve students at Auburn next year, twenty-four the second year, thirty-six the third year and forty-eight the fourth year and thereafter. For negroes, the quota at Tuskegee starts at four for next year and goes up to sixteen for the four year course. Each state will pay the regional center \$1,000 per year for each student from that state but if it fails to meet the quota, it must still pay for the equivalent of its quota whether any students from that state attend the regional center or not. On this basis South Carolina will be required to pay to Auburn a minimum of \$9,000 next year up to a maximum of \$12,000 if the South Carolina quota is completely filled. These figures would rise to a minimum of \$36,000 and a maximum of \$48,000 on the fourth and each succeeding year. Payments at Tuskegee next year would begin at a minimum of \$3,000 with a maximum of \$4,000 and in four years these figures would rise to a \$12,000 minimum and \$16,000 maximum.

In medicine, all the white medical colleges, either state supported or privately endowed within the region which are accredited by the American Medical Association, are designated as regional schools for white students, but only Meharry Medical College at Nashville is designated as a regional school for negro medical students. In fact, the plans call for the Regional Council to assume full responsibility for the operation of Meharry College, which is now faced with bankruptcy. The two

programs mentioned above which are supposed to begin operation next September will cost the state of South Carolina \$120,000 during the next fiscal year. Governor J. Strom Thurmond has requested the General Assembly to make an appropriation of that amount to insure South Carolina's participation in the plan.

It is true that the plan for regional education in the South is not entirely a plan to perpetuate segregation at the graduate and professional levels. Such a plan has been under discussion in the South for some fifteen years since it is recognized that for every Southern State to furnish a full program of graduate and professional studies would be a severe drain on the resources of these states. However, the negro problem brought the matter to a head, and certainly the continuation of segregation at the college levels is the important purpose of the plan.

Fundamentally the plan is sound in so far as it pools the resources of the Southern States to improve the caliber of higher education in the South. It should be obvious that it will be more economical to get the backing of all the Southern States for schools which have already developed and to improve these schools and make them outstanding institutions than it would be for each Southern State to attempt to duplicate all these services at state expense and possibly to doubly duplicate them, if that term may be used, in order to preserve the principle of segregation. However, there are many obstacles to overcome if the plan is to succeed, obstacles of both a legal and a policy nature.

Let us first look at the legal obstacles of the plan. The Constitution provides that no state can enter into an agreement or compact with another state without the consent of Congress. Such consent has not been secured and may never be secured. In the light of the civil rights fight, this is hardly a propitious time to ask Congress to approve an interstate agreement which definitely has as one of its purposes the perpetuation of segregation in Southern Colleges. However, the lack of Congressional approval may not of itself be a fatal defect of the plan. The interstate compact clause of the Constitution has in the past been more honored by the breach than the observance. Very few formalized interstate agreements have ever been submitted to Congress for approval, and it is quite probable that for every such agreement which has the approval of Congress, there are a hundred agreements which have never even been submitted to Congress for approval. For example, the State of West Virginia which has only a two year medical college, has

a written agreement with the State of Virginia by terms of which the State of Virginia binds herself to furnish the last two years of medical training to the West Virginia students who have successfully completed the two year medical course offered by West Virginia University. Although this agreement has been in effect for several years without congressional approval, it has never been challenged in any court. Other examples of such an interstate agreement are between two state governors over the location of a bridge over an interstate stream and over the policing of a stream which serves as the boundary between two states. Since it is common practice among states to make these agreements without the consent of Congress, it may well be that the United States Supreme Court will not consider the lack of congressional approval as a fatal defect of the regional education plan when the plan comes before that court for review as it most certainly will.

Another possible legal objection to the plan is the question of whether a state under its own constitution and laws can legally spend money to help support an institution of learning located in another state. This is probably a minor legal point and might be corrected by changes in the constitutions or codes of the participating states.

The most serious legal hurdle that the regional plan will have to clear is the matter of furnishing education to a negro outside the boundary of the state, even in a school which is partially supported by the state. The dictum of the *Wrighten* and *Gaines* cases definitely requires that the negro be entitled to education WITHIN THE BORDERS of the state if such education is furnished to whites. Obviously a South Carolina negro would have no legal grounds for complaint if he is required to go to Alabama for an education in veterinary medicine provided a white South Carolina veterinary medicine student must also leave the state for his education; but what about the Georgia negro who is required to go to Tuskegee Institute in Alabama while his white compatriot is furnished the same education within the borders of Georgia? A South Carolina negro might have a legal basis for complaint if he is required to take his medical course at Meharry College in Tennessee while a white South Carolina medical student can be educated at Charleston. It would require a complete reversal of at least this part of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the *Gaines* case to uphold the constitutionality of the regional system and such reversal is highly unlikely. This stumbling block of constitution-

ality of the regional plan may well be the immovable object on which the plan will be demolished.

There are other difficulties about the plan which are of a policy nature, rather than a legal nature. To what extent will the legislature of one state be willing to lend partial support to an educational institution in another state? To what extent will the states in which the regional institutions are located be willing to make capital outlays to enlarge their facilities to accommodate students from other states? These are two important questions of policy. If South Carolina should agree to admit to the Medical College of South Carolina twenty students each year from Florida, which has no medical school, this could be done by refusing admission to an equal number of South Carolina applicants. We are unable to accept now, because of limited facilities, all the qualified South Carolina students who would like to study medicine. Will we reject even more of our own citizens to make way for Florida students? Obviously we will not. The alternative is to invest a considerable sum of money as a capital outlay to enlarge our present facilities in order to accommodate Florida students. It is unthinkable that the General Assembly of South Carolina would authorize such an expenditure and equally unthinkable that the Legislature of Florida would appropriate money to build buildings and provide laboratory facilities in South Carolina. These obstacles of policy may be just as fatal to the plan as the legal obstacles. The theory is fine but the plan has been formulated on too short notice and has not been properly thought through. Its success is extremely doubtful and if the regional plan fails because of obstacles of policy or is declared unconstitutional by the courts, what then?

The Southern States will be faced with either adopting the Arkansas plan of admitting negroes on an unsegregated basis to the state supported white schools where the courses they desire are not available in state supported negro schools or they may adopt the South Carolina plan of adding new courses to the state supported negro schools as the demand arises. Such a plan is very expensive, though probably not prohibitively so, especially if the Southern States will take stock of their white schools and eliminate, as some Southern States have already done, the wasteful duplication of services furnished by the white state schools. On this score South Carolina has done virtually nothing, but much could be done and may have to be done if the regional plan runs foul of the courts and the problem of educating our negroes is thrown back in our laps.

Since South Carolina has already embarked upon a program of providing additional courses of study for negroes on a segregated basis at the State College when demand for such courses is made, we must consider what it would cost the state to equalize college facilities and training if the regional plan is declared unconstitutional or collapses of its own weight. The present valuation of the real estate and equipment of the five white state supported colleges in South Carolina is \$26,685,176, according to state estimates. The value of the real estate and equipment of the negro school at Orangeburg is \$1,850,000. These figures do not take into account unexpended appropriations for capital improvements, which, if added, would weigh the balance more heavily in favor of the white schools. No one would suggest that the state would be required to expend almost \$25,000,000 to equalize college facilities but possibly the figure would more nearly approach four or five million dollars in say a ten year period, if all fields of study now available to white college students in South Carolina are provided for negroes. The five million figure should even cover a negro medical college. Of course, considerably enlarged annual appropriations for operation would be necessary, but it is not an impossible undertaking and would undoubtedly be more satisfactory to the people of this state than would the breaking down of the system of segregation. Segregation is a luxury which the state must be prepared to pay for if it is to be maintained.

The spectacular Gaines and Wrighten cases have centered attention on the problem of negro education at the college level, but recent developments, not so well publicized, but even more dangerous, are now evident in a frontal attack on the public schools by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

On July 29, 1948, a federal district judge in Virginia departed entirely from the time honored criterion of "substantial equality" in education and ordered the school authorities of King George County in Virginia to provide facilities for study for negroes which were actually equal to such facilities supplied to the whites. This case, instigated and handled in court by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, led to an order by Federal Judge Hutcheson permanently enjoining the school authorities of King George County from further racial discrimination and ordering them to furnish the negroes of that county school facilities actually equal to those of the whites. Under threat of contempt proceedings against the school authorities, the people of the county voted a

bond issue of \$150,000 for equalizing these facilities. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People followed up the victory in King George County by starting similar suits in other Virginia counties and, as a result of one of these cases, three members of the Board of Education and the county superintendent of Gloucester County were fined \$250 apiece for contempt of court. Already the National Association for Advancement of Colored People in South Carolina has served notice that a series of similar suits will be brought shortly in South Carolina.

In the light of these developments, let us analyze the situation as it now exists in the public schools of South Carolina. The physical properties now used for white public schools in this state are valued at over 55 million dollars; those used for negro public school education at slightly in excess of nine million. An official of the State Department of Education has estimated that it would require an expenditure of 50 million dollars to equalize the physical facilities for the two races and this is not taking into account other factors. In 1947, 1,750 buses and 91 automobiles transported 87,220 white pupils to school while 65 buses and twelve automobiles transported 3,769 negro pupils. The average annual salary paid negro public school teachers was \$1,025 while white teachers averaged better than \$1,600. In 1947-48 the state spent almost \$34,500,000 on public school education, approximately seventy-five percent of which went for white education. With 39% of the total number of public school pupils, negro education at that level received approximately 25% of state funds. In 1946-47 the number of negro pupils enrolled in the elementary schools actually exceeded the total of such white pupils. The great discrepancy in numbers is at the high school level where only 37% as many negroes are enrolled as white students. This is no doubt partially due to the woeful lack of adequate high school facilities for negroes particularly in the smaller counties. It is unnecessary to cite further statistics to prove what we already know, namely, that there is nothing remotely approaching equality of educational opportunities for the two races in the public schools of South Carolina.

Faced with these hard and unpleasant facts, what are we going to do about it? Shall we wait until we are forced, county by county, to equalize our schools with contempt proceedings forcing drastic and ill considered legislation or shall we face the issue squarely and work out a practical long range program that can be accomplished? The latter approach would appear

to be far more logical. A huge bond issue designed to accomplish immediate equalization would leave unsolved the problem of increased cost of operation and would also leave untouched the pressing problem of improving our white schools which today are far below average nationally.

The answer would seem to be a drastically increased annual budget for the public school system. Federal aid, if and when it comes, will be of great assistance but at the present time the State of South Carolina is carrying 94% of the load with only six percent coming from the Federal Government. Even with increased federal aid, the State will have to continue to bear the greater part of the expense of the public schools, and any real improvement in the schools, both white and colored, must come by state action rather than by action of the 1,680 school districts of the state.

Where improvement is most needed, the local units are least able to increase their budgets and the heavy concentration of negroes is in the poorer counties. Increased local assessments will not suffice. The state must assume far more of the expense of operation than it now assumes and if that is to be the case, where is the money coming from? That is, of course, a policy problem which can only be decided by the General Assembly. However, it may not be out of the way to express one man's opinion.

The additional revenue required might be secured by raising the state income tax, but such a move would not be wise because already the South Carolina income tax is reasonably high, compared to other states. Increased taxes on gasoline, intoxicants, cigarettes and soft drinks would be undesirable and in some cases might reach the point of diminishing returns. The only large source of untouched revenue for South Carolina is a general sales tax. A tax comparable to the Mississippi sales tax would produce, under present conditions, probably between fifteen and twenty million dollars annually; and this sum, if earmarked for education, would make it possible not only to equalize our schools over a period of years but to improve our schools to the point that they would approximate the schools in the wealthier states. There are many objections to a general sales tax, but there is no disputing the fact that such a tax would bring in a larger sum of money than could reasonably be raised from any other source. It would also rest on a broader base and would touch many who now pay little or no taxes to the state. Part of the money could and should be used for higher

education but the lion's share of it should go to the public schools.

The task is not hopeless if the facts are realized and courageously faced. Let us hope that the people of South Carolina and the other Southern States will meet this challenge with courage, fortitude, and wisdom and a determination to afford to their youth educational opportunities inferior to none in the nation.

CONSTITUTION

I

The name of this organization shall be The South Carolina Historical Association.

II

The objects of the Association shall be to promote historical studies in the State of South Carolina; to bring about a closer relationship among persons living in this State who are interested in history; and to encourage the preservation of historical records.

III

Any person approved by the executive committee may become a member by paying \$2.00 and after the first year may continue a member by paying an annual fee of \$2.00.

IV

The officers shall be a president, a vice-president, and a secretary and treasurer who shall be elected by ballot at each regular annual meeting. A list of nominations shall be presented by the executive committee, but nominations from the floor may be made. The officers shall have the duties and perform the functions customarily attached to their respective offices with such others as may from time to time be prescribed.

V

There shall be an executive committee made up of the officers and of two other members elected by ballot for a term of three years; at the first election; however, one shall be elected for two years. Vacancies shall be filled by election in the same manner at the annual meeting following their occurrence. Until such time they shall be filled by appointment by the president. The duties of the executive committee shall be to fix the date and place of the annual meeting, to attend to the publication of the proceedings of the Association, to prepare a program for the annual meetings, to prepare a list of nominations for the officers of the Association as provided in Article IV, and such other duties as may be from time to time assigned to them by the Association. There shall be such other committees as the president may appoint, or be instructed to appoint, by resolution of the Association.

VI

There shall be an annual meeting of the Association at the time and place appointed by the executive committee.

VII

The Association shall publish annually its proceedings to be known as *The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association*. It shall contain the constitution, by-laws, and minutes of the annual meeting together with such papers and documents selected by the executive committee as may be published without incurring a deficit. It is understood that all papers read at the annual meeting become the property of the Association except as otherwise may be provided by the executive committee. The executive committee shall annually elect an editor of the *Proceedings*. He shall have authority to appoint an associate editor and shall be a member of the executive committee, but without vote.

VIII

This constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the members present at the annual business meeting.

MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION

Alexander, Thomas B.....	Clemson College, Clemson, S. C.
Baker, Mary Neel.....	Greenwood High School, Greenwood, S. C.
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Barnwell, Mrs. Robert W., Jr.....	Greenville, Tenn.
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Bolen, C. Waldron.....	Clemson College, Clemson, S. C.
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Burts, Robert M., Jr.....	Presbyterian College, Clinton, S. C.
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de Treville, Catherine.....	Greenville Senior High School, Greenville, S. C.
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